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Abstract 
 
 For decades, both state and federal governments have taken a larger role in the property 
and casualty market.  The National Flood Insurance Plan directly writes policies.  In contrast, the 
California Fair Access to Insurance Requirement establishes a last-resort insurance pool for those 
unable to find certain types of coverage through conventional means.  Finally, the Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act establishes a federal reinsurance backstop in the event of a severe terror loss.  
While each program seeks to expand property and casualty coverage, some have been more 
successful than others.  This thesis examines the efficacy of each program and provides reform 
suggestions.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Since the agricultural revolution, individuals have sought to mitigate the risks found in 
everyday life.  The first examples of insurance occurred in Babylon as early as 4,000 BCE and 
protected against maritime losses.1  Insurance is a way for many parties to spread risk among a 
larger pool.  Insurers do this by collecting premiums commensurate with the level of assumed 
risk.  In addition to the revenue and profit generated from the collection of premiums, insurance 
firms also invest this money to fund operations and generate profits.  Modern insurance has 
evolved in its complexity, but still operates on the same principles as it did in Babylon. 
Today, this insurance market has expanded to cover everything from bond defaults to the 
haircuts of celebrities.  In the United States, some of the earliest coverage was for protection 
from the fires that frequently ravaged cities.2  As the nation industrialized, insurance firms grew 
to meet the needs of the expanding economy.  Since the origin of the industry, firms have 
struggled to calculate the appropriate amount to charge insureds.  While insurers can do this 
more effectively today, the underwriting profit margins are still quite small.  Certain product 
lines such as flood, fire, and domestic terror have seen significant losses.  Premiums have risen 
in the private sector to match.  In certain circumstances, many consumers are being priced out of 
the market.  In response to these rate increases, the federal as well as state governments have 
entered property and casualty markets.  Each of these programs operate differently.  Some adhere 
more closely to traditional underwriting standards while others disregard them. Some programs 
have operated more successfully than others. 
 
1 “Insurance - Historical Development of Insurance,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed April 22, 2021, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/insurance. 
2 “Insurance - Historical Development of Insurance.” 
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At both the federal and state level, the government has become more involved in subsidizing 
the property & casualty markets.  In the 1960s, Congress established the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP) to help provide flood coverage to those who live in flood prone areas. 
the NFIP behaves similarly to a traditional insurance firm as they collect premiums and pay 
claims directly.   Millions of Americans protect their homes with these policies, yet this 
institution is in significant need of reform.  As climate change is causing sea levels to rise 
globally, this will put even more Americans who live and work in coastal areas at risk.3  
Furthermore, there have been many severe floods inland as well.  Most climate predictions 
indicate that these severe weather instances will continue.  There has also been an upsurge in the 
power and frequency of hurricanes.  This will likely lead to more losses.  The Trump 
administration allocated more funding to relief programs such as the National Flood Insurance 
Program.  However, organizations like the Federal Emergency Management Agency have not 
updated some flood maps in decades.  Furthermore, if losses are too severe, there is the 
possibility that insurers will not be able to cover the losses.  
Other experts in the field highlight the importance of quality risk management for flood 
insurance.  In the United States, flood insurance is intertwined with federal policy as the federal 
government writes coverage for homes and businesses.4  These have ramifications for both the 
insureds and the taxpayer; experts across the political spectrum recognize the need for reform.5  
The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) subsidizes flood insurance, thus keeping rates 
artificially low.  This is problematic as the agency already runs a deficit, which is most likely 
 
3 Timothy R. Homan, “Climate Change Poses Major Risk to Flood Insurance Program, Experts Warn,” Text, The Hill, September 12, 2019, 
https://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/461180-climate-change-poses-major-risk-to-flood-insurance-program-experts. 
4 Jim Hall, “Journal of Flood Risk Management,” Journal of Flood Risk Management 3, no. 1 (March 2010): 1–2, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1753-
318X.2009.01059.x. 
5 “Overwhelming Risk: Rethinking Flood Insurance in a World of Rising Seas | Union of Concerned Scientists,” accessed October 17, 2020, 
https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/overwhelming-risk-rethinking-flood-insurance-world-rising-seas. 
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going to continue to grow.  Many future claims are expected to be paid out to the same properties 
repeatedly.  While there are proposals to modify this program, much more change is needed.   
As outlined in its foundational documents, the NFIP’s objectives are to “i) identify areas of 
flood risk, ii) encourage communities to implement measures to mitigate against the risk of flood 
loss, iii) and provide financial assistance, through contracts of insurance, to help individuals and 
small businesses recover rapidly from flood disasters.”6  Until 1986, the NFIP was financially 
self-sufficient.  However, a combination of below-market rates combined with an increase in 
catastrophic losses have put the program in peril.  This is compounded by the fact that the NFIP 
“cannot charge rate-based premiums, hold loss reserve funds to offset unusually catastrophic 
losses, or purchase reinsurance, the program faces a constant risk of financial insolvency.”7  
Insurance scholars have identified key reform areas such as, “(1) risk modeling and risk 
communication, (2) the roles of the public and private sector, (3) take‐up rates, (4) incentives for 
risk reduction, and (5) rate setting and the financing of catastrophic flood events.”8  Even though 
these reform objectives may remedy many of the systemic issues facing the NFIP, achieving 
them will be difficult.  Instead, the nation’s flood risk can be better managed by the private 
sector. 
State governments have also become directly involved in the property and casualty insurance 
market.  The fire seasons of the past two decades have been particularly damaging, which has 
increased the cost of underwriting fire risk in California.  As a result, many insureds struggle to 
 
6 Rawle King, “National Flood Insurance Program: Background, Challenges, and Financial Status,” Congressional Research Service, July 1, 
2011. 
7 King. 
8 Carolyn Kousky, “Financing Flood Losses: A Discussion of the National Flood Insurance Program: Financing Flood Losses,” Risk 
Management and Insurance Review 21, no. 1 (March 2018): 11–32, https://doi.org/10.1111/rmir.12090. 
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find coverage.9 As global weather patterns shift and forest fires become more of a risk, insurers 
are struggling to fairly determine appropriate premium amounts for those who live in wildfire-
prone areas.  In California, this has caused the state legislature to pass several laws regarding the 
transparency of the underwriting methods of insurance carriers operating in that state.  While 
some insurers have been able to comply, some are leaving the state as they are no longer able to 
profitably do business there.   
For decades, the California Fair Access to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) Plan has offered 
basic insurance policies to Californians who cannot purchase a plan through a conventional 
insurance market.  Every property and casualty insurer who operates in the state must contribute 
to this pool.  There are many regulations governing its operation and these policies only provide 
basic coverage up to a predefined dollar amount.  Increased fire losses have put financial strain 
on the FAIR plan as well as the California property and casualty market as a whole.  Unlike, the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), the Fair Access to Insurance Requirement (FAIR) 
plan does not use government subsidies and therefore cannot rely on tax revenue to augment its 
balance sheet.  However, the FAIR plan must ensure that it is financially stable, or insurers will 
be forced to leave the California Property and Casualty Market completely.10   
Like the NFIP, the FAIR plan interferes with the insurance market in California operating 
at maximum efficiency.  However, the most severe policy issues are not directly insurance 
related.  Overly restrictive zoning policies, and poor forestry management exacerbate the risks 
from wildfires.  Addressing these problems will help reduce the annual damage from fires in 
 
9 Michael Hiltzik, “Column: California’s Fire Insurance Market Reaches a Crisis,” Los Angeles Times, August 29, 2019, 
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2019-08-28/hiltzik-california-fire-insurance-crisis. 
10 Daniel Veroff, “What Is the California FAIR Plan? | Property Insurance Coverage Law Blog | Merlin Law Group,” Property Insurance 
Coverage Law Blog, October 11, 2019, https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/2019/10/articles/insurance/what-is-the-california-fair-
plan/. 
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California. Additionally, the State of California could require that those covered by the FAIR 
plan take additional steps to mitigate their risk.  In areas where wildfires pose a more serious 
risk, some insurers are requiring fire retardant landscaping.  While it is true that climate change 
has had a significant impact on the severity of forest fires, there are many preventative measures 
that homeowners can do to protect their residences.  Defensive measures like fire resistant 
landscaping can reduce the damage of a fire when it does occur.11  However, repealing overly 
restrictive zoning laws and improving forestry management techniques will be the most 
impactful policy changes.    
The United States government has also entered the reinsurance market.  Since the 
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, the federal government has created the Terrorism Risk 
Insurance Act (TRIA) to help mitigate terror losses by acting as a reinsurance backstop.12  Terror 
events are infrequent and can drastically vary in severity.  As a result, it is incredibly difficult to 
create actuarial data for these events.  Many insurers are hesitant to offer these products if the 
scope of potential damages cannot be assessed.  The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) has 
sought to remedy this. Unlike the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), policies cannot be 
directly purchased through it.  In practice, it functions more like a reinsurer.  It differs from the 
California Fair Access to Insurance Requirement (FAIR) plan in that the private insurers are not 
obligated to participate.  Even though the threat of traditional terror attacks still exists, 
cyberterrorism now poses an equal threat.  Going forward, the considerations for severe cyber 
terror events will need to be incorporated into TRIA decision-making.  
 
11 F.C Dennis, “Fire-Resistant Landscaping - 6.303,” Extension (blog), accessed October 17, 2020, https://extension.colostate.edu/topic-
areas/natural-resources/fire-resistant-landscaping-6-303/. 
12 “Terrorism and Insurance,” Rocky Mountain Insurance Information Association, accessed March 31, 2021, 
http://www.rmiia.org/catastrophes_and_statistics/terrorism_insurance.asp. 
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The level of reimbursement under the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) varies by the 
scope of the terror attack.  In the case of a small loss, the insurer is responsible for covering the 
full amount.  Only events that reach a certain threshold are eligible for reimbursement.  To date, 
no terror event has met this threshold.  Theoretically, the largest losses would be borne 
completely by the government.  Currently, “the specifics of the current program are as follows: 
(1) a terrorist act must cause $5 million in insured losses to be certified for TRIA coverage; (2) 
the aggregate insured losses from certified acts of terrorism must be $180 million in a year for 
the government coverage to begin (this amount increases to $200 million in 2020); and (3) an 
individual insurer must meet a deductible of 20% of its annual premiums for the government 
coverage to begin. Once these thresholds are met, the government covers 81% of insured losses 
due to terrorism (this amount decreases to 80% in 2020).  If the insured losses are less than $37.5 
billion, the Secretary of the Treasury is required to recoup 140% of government outlays through 
surcharges on TRIA-eligible property and casualty insurance policies.  As insured losses rise 
above $37.5 billion, the Secretary is required to recoup a progressively reduced amount of the 
outlays.  At some high insured loss level, which will depend on the exact distribution of losses, 
the Secretary would no longer be required to recoup outlays.”13  Fortunately, there have not been 
any major terror attacks since 2001 in the United States.  To date, this program has achieved its 
goals.  However, it is unclear as to whether it would be able to withstand a large-scale attack or 
the heightened cyberterrorism risk.   
Despite attempting to achieve the same goal of risk mitigation, these aforementioned 
policies all operate differently.  Certain ones, such as the National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP) and the Fair Access to Insurance Requirement (FAIR) plan deal directly with retail 
 
13 Baird Webel, “Terrorism Risk Insurance: Overview and Issue Analysis for the 116th Congress” (Congressional Research Service, December 
27, 2019). 
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consumers.  However, only the NFIP directly collects premiums from insureds.  The Terrorism 
Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) differs from both the FAIR plan and the NFIP as it primarily 
functions as a reinsurer.  None of these programs function as effectively as private sector 
solutions.  There are many reforms that would improve each program but doing so is a lengthy 
and expensive process.  Shifting the risk managed by the NFIP, FAIR plan, and TRIA to the 
private sector will improve outcomes for insureds as private firms are better able to adapt to the 
changing demands of the property and casualty market.      
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Chapter 2: Overview of the National Flood Insurance Program  
  
In the United States, flooding is one of the most common and costly natural disasters.  
Some of the most common flood types come from heavy rainfall.  Hurricane-prone coastal 
regions are often prone to seasonal flooding.  However, other regions in the country are at risk as 
well.  Heavy rainfall can occur in most places in the United States, which can cause waterways 
to overflow.  While hurricanes do not threaten northern latitudes with the same severity, snow 
melt can cause severe flooding in these regions.  From 1972 to 2006, the property losses from 
flooding have costed over $94 billion.14  The past two decades have seen more severe losses for a 
myriad of reasons, including climate change and development in flood prone areas.   
Given the national concern over flood risk, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
was established in 1968.  For 18 years, this program did not require subsidy from the government 
as the premiums collected covered all expenses. However, several factors have changed, thus 
making the NFIP no longer financially sustainable.  According to the Congressional Research 
Service, “the policy objectives of the NFIP [are] to (1) identify and map the nation’s regulated 
floodplains to make the public aware of flood hazards; (2) address the escalating cost of federal 
disaster assistance for flood damaged buildings and their contents; (3) allow property owners 
within communities that adopted and enforced a Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) approved floodplain management ordinance to purchase insurance as a protection 
against flood losses; and (4) guide development and building practices to save lives and reduce 
future property damage.”15 The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has operated with a 
 
14 Stanley A. Changnon, “Assessment of Flood Losses in the United States,” Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education 138, no. 1 
(April 17, 2008): 38–44, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1936-704X.2008.00007.x. 
15 King, “National Flood Insurance Program: Background, Challenges, and Financial Status.” 
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deficit for decades and will continue to do so unless changes are made to its organizational 
structure.   
 The NFIP offers three main types of coverage.  The coverage for dwellings is intended to 
“insure one to four family residential buildings and single-family dwelling units in a 
condominium building.” General Property insurance “is used to insure five or more family 
residential buildings and non-residential buildings.”  Residential Condominium Building 
Association policies “insure residential condominium association buildings.”16  Under the 
National Flood Insurance Program, the Dwelling insurance insures the building value up to 
$250,000 and the contents of the property up to $100,000.  Commercial coverage increases these 
limits to $500,000, respectively.17  Many insureds who purchase policies through the NFIP do 
not fully understand the limited nature of the coverage of which they are purchasing.  Unlike a 
valued policy, which pays “the limit of liability in the event of a total loss,” the NFIP only pays 
the replacement cost of the damages.  The policy also does not guarantee the replacement of the 
residence if the replacement cost is greater than the policy limit.  Given the limited nature of 
these policies, homeowners are encouraged to purchase additional coverage in the private 
market. 
 To do its job, the NFIP must have accurate data.  However, many of the flood maps used 
to make decisions are outdated.  Recent floods have brought attention to these issues, yet there is 
still much that needs to be done.18  In addition to the monetary costs of updating the flood maps, 
the government has many stakeholders who may not universally support these efforts.  Property 
owners may be resistant to paying increased premiums.  Recently, FEMA has incorporated the 
 
16 “National Flood Insurance Program Summary of Coverage” (FEMA, n.d.). 
17 “National Flood Insurance Program Summary of Coverage for Commercial Property” (FEMA, n.d.). 
18 “Flood Mapping for the Nation: A Cost Analysis for Completing and Maintaining the Nation’s NFIP Flood Map Inventory,” Association of 
State Floodplain Managers, 2020. 
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“residual flood risk behind levees” into recent flood maps.  Residents who now live in areas 
designated as a flood risk are required to purchase flood insurance if their mortgage is federally 
backed.  Even though this may provide a financial hardship for some, ignoring the issue does not 
eradicate it.  Increased flood risk has put more properties at risk as seen over the past three 
decades.  Individuals who are uninsured or underinsured for their flood risk may be left without 
recourse if their home or business is destroyed by flooding.  Often these individuals will require 
emergency funds from FEMA.  Since accurate flood data could inform better underwriting and 
building practices, updating flood maps will provide significantly more benefits than issues.19  
 One of the primary benefits of updating flood maps is providing accurate information for 
new development.  As of 2020, FEMA’s flood maps only cover “one-third of the nation’s 3.5 
million miles of streams and 46% of shoreline.”20  FEMA argues that the majority of unmapped 
areas are in sparsely populated rural locations.  However, many of these areas may be at risk.  
Furthermore, the rise in remote work that has resulted from the policy response to COVID-19 
may cause a migration away from densely populated urban areas.  According to the Pew 
Research Center, twenty-two percent of adults in the United States have relocated due to 
COVID-19 or know people who have.  Reasons listed include job losses, concern over health, 
change of working environment, and military deployment.21  While some of these circumstances 
may be temporary, others are not.  It is likely that populations will increase in areas with 
inadequate flood risk assessments.  In 2020, some of the states with the highest migration rates 
 
19 King, “National Flood Insurance Program: Background, Challenges, and Financial Status.” 
20 Thomas Frank, “Studies Sound Alarm on Badly Out-of-Date FEMA Flood Maps,” Scientific American, February 27, 2020, 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/studies-sound-alarm-on-badly-out-of-date-fema-flood-maps/. 
21 D’vera Cohn, “About a Fifth of U.S. Adults Moved Due to COVID-19 or Know Someone Who Did,” Pew Research Center (blog), July 6, 
2020, https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/07/06/about-a-fifth-of-u-s-adults-moved-due-to-covid-19-or-know-someone-who-did/. 
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included Florida, Texas, North Carolina, and South Carolina.22  These states are also some of the 
most likely to be flooded.23  If up-to-date flood maps are kept of all inhabitable areas, better 
decisions can be made about new development and zoning. 
 It would be remiss to imply that updating the flood maps for the United States would be 
an easy task.  Estimates for comprehensive flood mapping run from $3.2 billion to $11.8 billion.  
After the initial cost outlay, it can cost anywhere from $107 million to $480 million per year to 
maintain accurate flood maps.  There are many reasons for the large discrepancies in costs.  The 
speed at which these maps are to be developed has a significant impact on overall cost.  There is 
no clear answer as to the appropriate balance between cost efficiency and rate of mapping as 
flood severity varies yearly.24   
 One of the largest logistical hurdles to overcome in developing accurate flood maps is the 
vast geographical size of the United States.  “Based on the National Hydrology Dataset, there are 
approximately 3.5 million miles of streams in the nation.  Currently, about 1.14 million stream 
miles have flood maps…For coastal or shoreline mapping, NOAA’s official value for total 
length 95,471 miles.  Currently, about 44,158 miles of shoreline have flood maps.”25 
Historically, FEMA has targeted their efforts on mapping the areas of the United States with the 
highest population density. This becomes problematic if unmapped areas of the nation become 
developed, builders will not be able to accurately assess risk.  The National Flood Insurance 
Program will not be able to charge fair premiums for these regions either, further exacerbating 
 
22 Janelle Cammenga, “Where Are Americans Moving?,” Tax Foundation (blog), January 13, 2021, https://taxfoundation.org/state-migration-
trends/. 
23 Jason Koebler, “10 States Most at Risk of Flooding,” US News & World Report, March 14, 2012, 
https://www.usnews.com/news/slideshows/10-states-most-at-risk-of-flooding. 
24 “Flood Mapping for the Nation: A Cost Analysis for Completing and Maintaining the Nation’s NFIP Flood Map Inventory.” 
25 “Flood Mapping for the Nation: A Cost Analysis for Completing and Maintaining the Nation’s NFIP Flood Map Inventory.” 
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budgetary shortfalls. While there are numerous benefits in having a comprehensive flood map of 
the entire United States, prioritizing areas that are habitable is still prudent. State owned land 
often has restrictions that limit development.  Prioritizing other areas where people may live is 
far more prudent. Additionally, technological advances in mapping technology now allows for 
higher quality maps to be made at a lower cost.  FEMA should be sure to incorporate these 
considerations when allocating funding for new maps.  Even though developing flood maps for 
the majority of the United States will be a costly endeavor, it will prove worthwhile as improved 
maps will help reduce exposure to flood risk.26 
 Another challenge facing the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), as well as the 
property and casualty insurance market as a whole, are the increasing costs associated with flood 
risks.  On average, the profit margins for the property and casualty insurance industry are quite 
narrow; many insurance firms have years where they either post losses or only generate profit via 
their investment portfolio.  In the insurance industry, underwriting profit is measured by the 
Combined Ratio.  This defined as “the sum of two ratios, one calculated by dividing incurred 
losses plus loss adjustment expense by earned premiums (the calendar year loss ratio), and the 
other calculated by dividing all other expenses by either written or earned premiums (i.e., trade 
basis or statutory basis expense ratio)…A combined ratio below 100 percent is indicative of an 
underwriting profit.”27  In recent decades, increases in devastating floods have put pressure on 
the balance sheets of the NFIP and private insurers alike.   
 
26 “Flood Mapping for the Nation: A Cost Analysis for Completing and Maintaining the Nation’s NFIP Flood Map Inventory.” 
27 “Combined Ratio | Insurance Glossary Definition | IRMI.Com,” accessed February 18, 2021, https://www.irmi.com/term/insurance-
definitions/combined-ratio. 
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 In the past decade, the average combined ratio for the property and casualty insurance 
market saw average combined ratios above 100 percent during four different years.28  These high 
losses have been, in part, driven by increased flood losses.29  As private insurers take on more 
flood risk, this may provide some relief to the balance sheets of the NFIP.  However, this is not 
likely.  Even if total exposure decreases, overexposure to flood risk will prevent solvency.  
It is essential that all property and casualty actuarial models include increased flood risk 
from climate change.  Currently, the NFIP “covers more than 5 million flood insurance policies 
and collects approximately $4.75 billion in premiums, fees and surcharges each year.”30  
Increases in the frequency of extreme weather events and a rise in the average sea level will 
likely increase the risk of flooding.  Improved flood maps will help create more accurate 
assessments regarding flood risk.  In addition to mapping land that does not have updated flood 
risk data, the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) will need to account for the residual risk 
of communities protected by potentially inadequate flood protection.   
When inadequate flood protection fails, the impact can be devastating.  In 2005, the 
levees protecting New Orleans breeched during hurricane Katrina.  This resulted in devastating 
fatalities as well as extensive property damage; this storm cost homeowner insurers eight billion 
dollars.31 The causes of the failure of the levees in New Orleans, and the response to it, are 
complex issues with many causes.  However, there is evidence that the effects of this tragedy 
were exacerbated by levee designs that were “not appropriate for the purpose, the storm 
 
28 Brian Briggs and Erika Cosey, “U.S Property & Casualty and Title Insurance Industries,” National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 
no. 2019 First Half Results (2019). 
29 Ray Lehmann, “Private Flood Insurance Market Is Getting Bigger, More Competitive, Less Profitable,” Insurance Journal (blog), March 18, 
2018, https://www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/right-street/2018/03/18/483689.htm. 
30 Homan, “Climate Change Poses Major Risk to Flood Insurance Program, Experts Warn.” 
31 Stephanie Jones, “Hurricane Katrina: The Numbers Tell Their Own Story,” Insurance Journal, August 26, 2015, 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2015/08/26/379650.htm. 
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exceeded levee design standards, the levees were not actually built to the original design 
standards, the levees were not properly maintained, or a combination of these and other 
factors.”32  Accurate flood maps that include assessments of flood protection infrastructure would 
help provide information that can allow for improved disaster response. 
In the City of Mandeville, Louisiana, such flood mitigation strategies have proven to be 
quite effective.  In comparison to the surrounding towns and parishes, Mandeville faired better 
than average due to the comprehensive flood mitigation efforts taken.   
The NFIP “standards state that all new construction must be built at or above the Base 
Flood Elevation (BFE) shown on the city’s flood maps. The BFE represents the average 
floodwater elevation for a 100-year flood event, meaning that floors of buildings constructed to 
this standard will sit above the floodwater and avoid damage during all but the most severe flood 
events. 
Since the town has been in the program for more than 25 years, they’ve had ample 
opportunity to bring many buildings up to these standards. In 1993, the city voted to go one step 
further than the NFIP requirements to raise their elevation standard to one foot above the BFE. 
Thus, their newest buildings have added protection, and their owners enjoy a 30 percent 
reduction in the cost of their flood insurance…Mandeville’s mitigation efforts proved their worth 
during Hurricane Katrina. This storm was the first real test of the city’s floodplain building 
standards. Lakeshore Drive, which runs along Lake Ponchatrain in Mandeville, presents some 
pretty clear evidence of the effectiveness of home elevation. Along Lakeshore Drive, virtually 
every elevated home suffered little or no flood damage. The homes that were not elevated were 
substantially damaged. Some are completely gone.”33  When properly implemented, these flood 
mitigation strategies can drastically reduce flood damages.   
Updating flood maps, while initially costly, may pay for itself in the long run if flood 
losses are minimized.  In 1997, “FEMA conducted a benefit-cost analysis of its proposed flood 
mapping program (at the time it was call Map Modernization). Based on that analysis, floodplain 
mapping showed a benefit to the taxpayer of over $2 for every $1 invested in flood mapping.  In 
2008, the State of North Carolina used the same methodology as FEMA, and calculated a 
benefit-cost ratio of 2.3 to 1.”34   
 
32 “A Failure of Initiative- Final Report of the Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina,” House Report (Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, February 15, 2006). 
33 “Strong Building Code Protects Louisiana Town | FEMA.Gov,” accessed February 28, 2021, https://www.fema.gov/case-study/strong-
building-code-protects-louisiana-town. 
34 “Flood Mapping for the Nation: A Cost Analysis for Completing and Maintaining the Nation’s NFIP Flood Map Inventory.” 
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Given the broad range of stakeholders impacted by flooding, sources of funds for updated 
flood maps need not solely come from the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).  Local, 
state, and other funding sources are willing to contribute to the cost as all involved benefit.  In 
North Carolina, the state mapped 29,733 miles of streams, which returned an average of “$3,400 
per year per mile and clearly shows significantly higher benefits of having more detailed flood 
studies.”  This is logical as these aforementioned flood maps are the basis for local building and 
zoning decisions.  In addition to location, these decisions can help influence building codes to 
ensure that structures in flood prone areas are as resilient as possible.  “In fact, buildings 
constructed in compliance with NFIP building standards suffer approximately 80 percent less 
damage annually that those not built in compliance.  Lower damage amounts can be a proxy for 
lower impacts and demands on disaster assistance.”35 
Flood Study Type36 Range of Losses Avoided (per stream mile) 
Detailed Study $5,482 - $6,166 
Limited Detailed Study $1,713 - $2,539 
Approximate Study $721 
Fig. 2.1 
 
 Recently, there has been a federal initiative to update the nation’s flood maps in an 
initiative called Risk Rating 2.0.  “This new change…is part of a grand plan to bring the NFIP 
out of its $20 billion debt caused by paying out more than it collects. Devastation from Category 
5 Hurricane Katrina and several other storms in 2005 threw the program into what has been 
 
35 “Flood Mapping for the Nation: A Cost Analysis for Completing and Maintaining the Nation’s NFIP Flood Map Inventory.” 
36 “Flood Mapping for the Nation: A Cost Analysis for Completing and Maintaining the Nation’s NFIP Flood Map Inventory.” 
 
19 
 
perpetual red ink ever since.”37  This new metric will update the probabilistic models used to 
assess flood insurance risk.  Not only will this data be able to inform policy decisions about 
zoning, but it will also give the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) the information 
needed to charge appropriate premiums.38  Even though charging higher premiums is necessary, 
those required to pay higher premiums may not be pleased with these changes.  However, the 
director of the NFIP has not made any definitive statements about rate changes.  “Any entity 
claiming that they can provide insight or comparison to the Risk Rating 2.0 initiative, including 
premium amounts, is misinformed and setting public expectations that are not based in fact. 
While entities are free to suggest or estimate their opinion of what flood insurance premiums 
should be, they are offering exactly that — an opinion — and they do not have insight into the 
Risk Rating 2.0 initiative.”39  Since these new changes are in their nascency at the writing of this 
thesis, it is not possible to comment on their success.  Nonetheless, this policy decision is a 
positive step in the reformation of the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP). 
Perhaps one of the most beneficial outcomes of improved flood mapping is a set of better 
construction and zoning guidelines.  According to the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), “the primary objective of the Severe Repetitive Loss (SRL) properties strategy is to 
eliminate or reduce the damage to residential property and the disruption to life caused by 
repeated flooding. Approximately 9,000 insured properties have been identified with a high 
frequency of losses or a high value of claims.”  Properties are rated as Severe Repetitive Loss 
(SRL) if “any NFIP-insured residential property that has met at least 1 of the following paid 
flood loss criteria since 1978, regardless of ownership: 4 or more separate claim payments of 
 
37 Alex Harris, “Floridians Are Underpaying for Flood Insurance, Study Finds. Get Ready for Costs to Rise,” Miami Herald, February 22, 2021. 
38 Mike Amodeo and Saman Armal, “The Cost of Climate: America’s Growing Flood Risk,” First Street Foundation, 2021. 
39 Harris, “Floridians Are Underpaying for Flood Insurance, Study Finds. Get Ready for Costs to Rise.” 
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more than $5,000 each (including building and contents payments); or 2 more separate claim 
payments (building payments only) where the total of the payments exceeds the current value of 
the property.”40  SRL properties are a significant burden on the National Flood Insurance 
Program’s (NFIP) balance sheet.  
As climate change and increase land development activities continue to exacerbate SRL 
events, it is essential that the NFIP develop policies and strategies to mitigate these losses.  In an 
attempt to help rectify these issues, the United States Congress instructed the NFIP to create a 
program to help reduce the cost of SRL events.  Under the SRL Grant Program, “FEMA 
provides funds to state and local governments to make offers of assistance to NFIP-insured SRL 
residential property owners for mitigation projects that reduce future flood losses through 
acquisition or relocation of at-risk structures and conversion of the property to open space; 
elevation of existing structures; or dry floodproofing of historic properties.”41 
While the SRL policy that the NFIP has adopted is certainly an improvement, it is far 
from a complete solution.  According to research by the Pew Charitable Trusts, one percent of 
NFIP-insured properties are properties with a history of repeated floods. However, these account 
for twenty-five to thirty percent of the claims.  These properties account for approximately half 
of the NFIP’s twenty-three billion dollar debt.42  An audit by the Office of the Inspector General 
of The Department of Homeland Security found two major problems with the organizational 
structure of the National Flood Insurance Program’s Severe Repeated Loss program.  “Firstly, 
FEMA does not have reliable, accurate information about SRL properties.  This deficiency 
occurred because of ambiguous FEMA forms to request removal of SRL designation, poor 
 
40 “Guidance for Severe Repetitive Loss Properties” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, May 1, 2011). 
41 “Guidance for Severe Repetitive Loss Properties.” 
42 Phyllis Cuttino, “Repeatedly Flooded Properties Cost Billions.” 
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organizational structure, and unassigned roles for ensuring SRL data integrity.  As a result, 
FEMA is using inaccurate information to make funding-related decisions, including requesting 
appropriations from Congress, deciding where to implement large-scale mitigation projects, and 
determining which residential mitigation projects to fund through its Flood Mitigation Assistance 
grant program (FMA).  Additionally, not all NFIP policyholders who have mitigated their SRL 
property have benefited from reduced policy premiums.  Second, FEMA’s FMA, which aims to 
mitigate flood damage for NFIP policyholders, provides neither equitable nor timely relief to 
SRL applicants.  We attribute this inefficiency to decentralized FMA grant application 
requirements and inadequate enforcement of grant requirements.”43  Despite the best intentions 
of the directors of the NFIP, this program is not on a path to financial solvency.   
While there are many reform possibilities, it is unlikely that any will result in success.  
Reform attempts will prove costly and will take years to implement.  Furthermore, the NFIP is 
backed by the federal government, so it does not have the market incentives to become 
financially solvent.  Even though the NFIP does collect premiums, any budget overages can be 
covered by the federal government.  In practice, neither Democrats nor Republican federal 
lawmakers have shown any interest in reducing deficit spending.  Instead, the nation’s flood risk 
can be handled better by the private insurance sector.    
 
 
 
 
43 Cynthia Spishak, “FEMA Is Not Effectively Administering a Program to Reduce or Eliminate Damage Of Severe Repetitive Loss Properties,” 
Memorandum (Office of the Inspector General, July 29, 2020). 
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Chapter 3: Analysis of the National Flood Insurance Program  
 
 As established, flooding in the United States is one of the most damaging forms of 
natural disasters that occur.  While the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was intended 
to combat this, its results have been mediocre.  Financially, this program is no longer self-
sustaining.  Considering the high frequency of severe repetitive damages to a small percentage of 
properties, the NFIP has not been successful at incentivizing responsible building practices 
either.  This problem extends beyond financial solvency; severe flooding also results in a loss of 
life as well. 
 Another problem with the NFIP is that the entire country subsidizes a small subset of 
regions, many of which are predominantly wealthy.  As of 2020, the counties with the highest 
Severe Repeated Losses from flooding are Harris County, Texas, Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, 
Orleans Parish, Louisiana, St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana, Passaic County, New Jersey, 
Galveston County, Texas, Nassau County, New York, Suffolk County, New York, St. Charles 
County, Missouri, and Cape May County, New Jersey.  Half of the aforementioned counties have 
a median household income above the national median household income of 68,704 dollars; 
Nassau County is one of the wealthiest counties in the entire country.44 45  Furthermore, 
approximately twenty-five percent of policies written by the NFIP insure vacation properties.46  
It is unfair to expect taxpayers across the United States to subsidize vacation homes in the 
Hamptons.  It would be remiss to pretend as if all NFIP payouts go to the wealthy; several of the 
 
44 “Median Household Income (County): SAGE Stats,” 2018, https://data.sagepub.com/sagestats/document.php?id=4638. 
45 Jessica Semega et al., “Income and Poverty in the United States: 2019,” The United States Census Bureau, September 15, 2020, 
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2020/demo/p60-270.html. 
46 Ike Brannon and Ari Blask, “The Government’s Hidden Housing Subsidy for the Rich,” Politico, August 8, 2017, 
https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/08/08/hidden-subsidy-rich-flood-insurance-000495. 
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most impacted counties have median household incomes well below the average.  It is highly 
debatable whether subsidized insurance is ultimately beneficial to any demographic.  
 According to many property and casualty insurance experts, the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) undercharges for many of its policies.47  Subsidizing the flood insurance market 
for wealthy communities and vacation houses with taxpayer dollars is a poor allocation of these 
resources.  However, even subsidizing flood insurance for middle and low income individuals is 
also not effective in the long term.  The coverage provided by the NFIP is very limited in 
scope.48  Many insureds would need private market policies to be adequately covered in a flood 
event.  Furthermore, this artificial price reduction creates a form of moral hazard.  This is defined 
as “a situation in which one party gets involved in a risky event knowing that it is protected 
against the risk and the other party will incur the cost. It arises when both the parties have 
incomplete information about each other.”49   
When the government artificially lowers the cost of property ownership in certain areas, 
it hides the true cost of living in a flood prone area.  While this may be good for property owners 
as it augments real estate prices, it incentivizes poor decision-making.  Below-market flood 
insurance rates hide the true long-term cost and risk of property ownership in a certain area.  
Individuals and businesses with higher risk tolerances can still inhabit these areas but will be 
charged an adequate market rate for doing so.  Individuals and businesses who do not find such a 
benefit at the margin will seek real estate elsewhere.  In the long term, this leaves everyone 
involved better off.   
 
47 Paolo Taruc, “NFIP Undercharging, Incentivizing People to Take Risks - CEO,” August 14, 2018, 
https://www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/catastrophe/nfip-undercharging-incentivizing-people-to-take-risks--ceo-108697.aspx. 
48 “National Flood Insurance Program Summary of Coverage.” 
49 “What Is Moral Hazard? Definition of Moral Hazard, Moral Hazard Meaning,” The Economic Times, accessed February 22, 2021, 
https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/moral-hazard. 
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 Currently in the United States, private insurers only write a small number of the flood 
policies in force.  The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) writes the majority of these 
policies.  The popularity of NFIP policies is in large part due to the lower-than-average market 
premiums charged.  If the NFIP were to stop writing policies all together, the private insurance 
market would be able to underwrite these risks much more effectively.  The private sector 
already has a sophisticated risk mitigation system for managing flood losses.  Managing General 
Agents and Managing General Underwriters “identified were underwritten by a surplus lines 
carrier. Some offer a range of flood products underwritten by different carriers. For example, 
Orchid Underwriters offers primary and excess flood products backed by multiple carriers… 
Surplus lines companies tend to write standalone policies rather than endorsements to 
homeowners insurance; admitted companies generally lean in the other direction. To offer an 
endorsement, companies must first offer standard homeowners insurance policies. Because 
homeowners insurance is widely available in the admitted market, fewer surplus lines insurers 
offer homeowners coverage and associated flood endorsements.”50  Reinsurers also play a large 
role private sector flood insurance. This complex network of risk pooling is far better for the 
insured as more accurate prices will be charged and better insurance products will be offered.  
 As previously discussed, neither the commercial nor residential coverage offered through 
the NFIP is particularly comprehensive.  In order to be comprehensively protected, many 
insureds may seek coverage from the private market as well.  This additional policy is necessary 
when the value of the property or its contents exceed the coverage limit.  Since many insureds in 
high cost of living areas will need supplemental coverage as well, it raises the question as to 
 
50 Carolyn Kousky et al., “The Emerging Private Residential Flood Insurance Market in the United States” (Risk Management and Decision 
Processes Center, July 2018). 
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whether seeking coverage through the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) is even 
necessary.  According to research from the Wharton Risk Management and Decision Processes 
Center, the private flood insurance market has grown significantly since 2015.  This growth is 
not just limited to insurers who write policies for High-Net-Worth Individuals either.  Insurers 
across the price spectrum have sold more policies.51    
52 
        Figure 3.1 
 In the commercial flood insurance market, FM Global is a leader in this sector.53  Unlike 
the NFIP, their product offerings and services are far more comprehensive.  Before development 
begins, FM Global offers risk consulting services to identify issues before they arise.  While the 
NFIP’s initiative to improve flood maps is prudent, risk consulting services from private insurers 
are far more comprehensive.  FM Global, like many insurance firms, offers risk consulting 
 
51 Kousky et al. 
52 Kousky et al. 
53 Kousky et al. 
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services that are comprehensive.54  Many firms, including the aforementioned, also develop 
proprietary flood maps to augment actuarial models.55  Both the insurer and the insured benefit 
from these services.  The insured reduces the likelihood of a loss occurring and the expenses that 
accompany it.  Many insurers offer lower premiums for taking adequate steps to mitigate risk.  
Risk management also benefits insurers as they pay fewer claims.   
 The flood insurance products offered by private sector to individuals is far superior to the 
products offered by the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).  The premium offerings from 
firms such as Chubb Limited offer significantly more coverage.  Primary coverage offered 
through Chubb Limited covers up to fifteen million dollars of losses; excess coverage can be 
purchased for more valuable properties.  They also give special consideration to valuable and 
unique items.  The standard policy also covers living expenses while the damaged residence is 
being rebuilt or repaired.  While risk consulting is not traditionally offered to residential 
properties, Chubb offers up to five thousand dollars for renovations to mitigate flood risk.56  In 
the private sector, there is a stronger market incentive to prevent damage before it occurs as it 
impacts ultimate profitability.     
 The offerings from firms like Chubb Limited, while comprehensive, are out of reach 
from average Americans.  Nonetheless, there are many private sector firms that offer coverage at 
a lower price point that still offers better protection than the policies offered through the NFIP.  
The Liberty Mutual Group offers flood coverage for residential properties under the NFIP’s 
 
54 “Business Risk Consulting,” FM Global, accessed February 25, 2021, https://www.fmglobal.com/products-and-services/services/business-risk-
consulting-and-bia. 
55 “Flood,” FM Global, accessed February 25, 2021, https://www.fmglobal.com/research-and-resources/nathaz-toolkit/flood. 
56 “Flood Insurance | Chubb,” accessed February 25, 2021, https://www.chubb.com/us-en/individuals-families/products/natural-
disasters/flood.html. 
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Write Your Own Program (WYO).57  For those who do not wish to purchase flood protection 
directly through the NFIP, Write Your Own insurers act as intermediaries by “issu[ing] SFIPs 
[Standard Flood Insurance Policies] in their own name and handle claims adjustments.  Because 
of their role in this system, WYO companies are fiscal agents of the federal government. WYO 
companies deposit premiums in separate bank accounts from which they disburse claims and 
make refunds. After a deduction for a WYO company’s operating costs, SFIP premiums are 
deposited in the National Flood Insurance Fund in the U.S. Treasury. If a WYO company lacks 
sufficient funds to pay a claim or make a refund, it can draw on FEMA’s letters of credit from 
the U.S. Treasury.”58  While the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) does underwrite the 
majority of risk in this scenario, there is no reason why an insurer such as the Liberty Mutual 
Group could not underwrite such a risk if the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
stopped underwriting flood risk.  Instead, flood risk can be more effectively managed by the 
private sector.   
 One of the most important, yet least implemented, flood management methods available 
is involving homeowners in flood management.  It is historically been difficult to encourage 
homeowners to take preventive measures before experiencing a flood loss event.  Those that do 
encounter better results.  Investigating the property to determine flood risk before purchase is 
one important step.  Another is engaging in flood proofing measures.  At the time of publication, 
research found that flood mitigation methods can cost anywhere from 1,000 dollars to 10,000 
dollars per residence.  These methods can include purchasing flood mitigating devices such as 
sandbags and pumps.  Other more permanent strategies can include renovations to raise the 
 
57 “Flood Insurance | Flood Insurance Quotes | Liberty Mutual,” accessed February 27, 2021, https://www.libertymutual.com/property-
insurance/flood. 
58 Shaun Marker, “What Is The Write-Your-Own Insurance Policy Program?,” Property Insurance Coverage Law Blog, July 9, 2012, 
https://www.propertyinsurancecoveragelaw.com/2012/07/articles/insurance/what-is-the-writeyourown-insurance-policy-program/. 
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property out of harm’s way.  More extreme solutions can include the construction of flood 
control devices, such as levees, on one’s property or building a pier.59  For those that choose to 
live in flood-prone areas, this type of mitigation is crucial for long-term reduction in flood 
damage to both property and person.  
 Ultimately, private sector insurers must take a larger role in mitigating flood damage.  
Even though the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) has attempted to encourage 
preventive and defensive flood management systems, the success of these interventions has been 
minimal.60  If the nation’s flood risk were transferred from the public to private sector, it is likely 
that private insurance firms would be more successful at compelling better flood management 
behavior from the insured.  This could be accomplished in two primary ways.  Firstly, insurers 
could offer financial incentives to insureds for taking defensive action to protect flood-prone 
properties.  Examples can range from rainwater management to raising the structure.  Secondly, 
insurers can mitigate flood risk by charging appropriate premiums for the risk involved.  
Undercharging simply hides the true underlying flood risk. 
 Private sectors can also take actions at the macro level to combat climate change, which 
contributes to increased flood risk.  In the United States, electricity generation accounts for 
approximately twenty seven percent of total carbon emissions; burning coal to generate 
electricity is the most environmentally damaging.  Despite coal electricity production accounting 
for only twenty eight percent of electricity generated in the United States, it accounts for sixty 
six percent of the carbon dioxide emissions from power generation.61  One of the most important 
 
59 Shirley Bradway Laska, “Involving Homeowners in Flood Mitigation,” Journal of the American Planning Association 52, no. 4 (December 31, 
1986): 452–66, https://doi.org/10.1080/01944368608977119. 
60 Laska. 
61 “Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions,” Overviews and Factsheets, US EPA, accessed February 27, 2021, 
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actions that can be taken against climate change is abandoning coal power for more ecologically 
friendly alternatives.  Not only would this reduce greenhouse gas emissions but save lives as 
well.  Coal and natural gas are responsible for the most deaths related to energy production, 
while renewable sources of energy are the least.  Nuclear power is the safest globally, even when 
accounting for the Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi disasters.62   
Energy Source63 Mortality Rate (deaths/trillion kWhr) 
Coal – global average 100,000    (41% global electricity) 
Coal – China 170,000   (75% China’s electricity) 
Coal – U.S.  10,000    (32% U.S. electricity) 
Oil 36,000    (33% of energy, 8% of electricity) 
Natural Gas 4,000    (22% global electricity) 
Biofuel/Biomass  24,000    (21% global energy) 
Solar (rooftop)  440    (< 1% global electricity) 
Wind 150    (2% global electricity) 
Hydro – global average 1,400    (16% global electricity) 
Hydro – U.S.   5    (6% U.S. electricity) 
Nuclear – global average (w/ Chernobyl & Fukushima 
Daiichi 
 90    (11%  global electricity) 
Nuclear – U.S.  0.1    (19% U.S. electricity) 
Figure 3.2 
Even though energy policy is not directly controlled by insurers, property and casualty 
insurers can nonetheless have an impact on reducing emissions from energy production.  In July 
of 2019, Chubb Limited announced that they “will no longer sell insurance to or invest in 
companies that make more than 30% of their revenue from coal mining.  Chubb will also stop 
underwriting the construction of new coal-fired power plants. The company said for existing coal 
plants, insurance coverage for risks that exceed the 30% threshold will be phased out by 2022, 
and for utilities beginning in 2022.  Additionally, it will also not invest in companies that 
generate more than 30% of revenue from thermal coal mining or energy production from coal.”64  
 
62 James Conca, “How Deadly Is Your Kilowatt? We Rank The Killer Energy Sources,” Forbes, June 10, 2012, 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2012/06/10/energys-deathprint-a-price-always-paid/. 
63 Conca. 
64 Shanti Nair and Valerie Volcovici, “U.S. Insurer Chubb Pulls Back from Coal,” Reuters, July 1, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
chubb-ltd-ch-coal-policy-idUSKCN1TW3I2. 
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In addition to helping the environment, this decision also reflects a shift in the economics of 
power generation.  By the year 2030, a drop in the price of renewable energy will make fifty two 
percent of coal plants unprofitable.  Furthermore, “Nearly 60% of China’s existing coal plant 
fleet is running at an underlying loss…  [As] Institutional investors are increasingly divesting 
from fossil fuel companies due to the risk their assets will become stranded as tougher emissions 
cut targets discourage their use and renewable energy becomes even cheaper.”65  Many of the 
very same insurers that underwrite energy production are also exposed to flood risk.66  By no 
longer underwriting the unprofitable and environmentally destructive coal industry, insurers can 
reduce their risk of flood losses by influencing global energy policy.   
One concern that many may raise over completely privatizing the nation’s flood risk is 
that insureds may be left without recourse in the event of a severe flood event that bankrupts an 
insurer.  This concern is unfounded as all fifty states, Washington D.C., and Puerto Rico have 
insurance guaranty associations that protect the insured in the event of insolvency.  “Insurance 
guaranty associations provide protection to insurance policyholders and beneficiaries of policies 
issued by an insurance company that has become insolvent and is no longer able to meet its 
obligations… Insurance companies are required by law to be members of the guaranty 
association in states in which they are licensed to do business… If an insurance company has 
insufficient assets to pay policyholder claims, a guaranty association will obtain funds by 
assessing member insurers that write the same kind of business as the insolvent insurer. These 
assessments (together with the assets of the insurer) are then used to pay, up to statutory limits, 
the covered claims of policyholders of the insolvent company. An association may also provide 
 
65 Nina Chestney, “Nearly Half of Global Coal Plants Will Be Unprofitable This Year: Carbon Tracker,” Reuters, April 7, 2020, 
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continued coverage for the policyholder or transfer policies to healthy insurers.”67  If a certain 
insurer is unable to cover the flood losses, then these associations can protect insureds.  
However, avoiding an insurer with a poor financial track record is the best course of action as 
many states limit payouts from guaranty associations; the average cap for property and casualty 
claims is 300,000 dollars.  There are many rating agencies that investigate the financial strength 
of various insurance firms.  These agencies give the consumer the information needed to assess 
the risk of a given carrier.68       
Another solution to reducing flood risk that incorporates both the public and private 
sector is a system of tradeable flood mitigation permits.  This idea is nothing new; firms often 
trade carbon credits to reduce their overall carbon footprint.69  These flood permits could 
function in a similar fashion.  There are three ways these permits could function.  The first way is 
through a series of Tradeable Development Rights.  In order to be successful, there need to be 
predefined flood sensitive areas and counterpart development areas.  The local zoning authorities 
determine the flood threshold for a specific region and then allocates credits based on flood risk.  
These credits could either be grandfathered in or auctioned away.  There are limits to this type of 
flood credit system.  This only is viable in regions with development potential and non-
governmental organizations which own significant amounts of conservation land.  Farmers can 
also benefit from selling these flood permits. These Tradeable Development Rights also have 
 
67 “Guaranty Associations | ACLI.Com,” American Council of Life Insurers, accessed March 1, 2021, https://www.acli.com/Industry-
Facts/Guaranty-Associations#q1. 
68 Cameron Huddleston, “What Happens If Your Insurance Company Goes Out Of Business?,” Forbes Advisor, May 11, 2020, 
https://www.forbes.com/advisor/life-insurance/company-out-of-business/. 
69 Yusho Cho, “China’s National Carbon Trading Market Eyes June Debut in Shanghai,” Nikkei Asia, March 28, 2021, 
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limitations as they do not necessarily account for flood mitigation measures taken by the 
developer.70   
    Another form flood permitting that accounts for flood reduction are Tradeable Flood 
Reduction Permits.  Like the aforementioned Tradeable Development Rights, these can also 
incorporate land development proposals.  To develop such a system, policymakers in an area also 
must identify the current and target flood risk for a certain region.  However, these permits will 
also account for defensive flood mitigation strategies such as water retention construction 
projects and flood-safe landscaping.  However, this form of flood mitigation permit system is not 
without flaws.  Flood mitigation structures and zones can simply be traded without the creation 
of beneficial new flood mitigation structures.  These Tradeable Flood Reduction Permits 
function best in areas where these structures do not already exist.71 
Finally, Tradeable Risk Neutral Permits help to remedy the issues of the other forms of 
flood mitigation.  These function similarly to Tradeable Flood Reduction Permits, but require the 
developer to take flood reduction measures to reduce flood risk before constructing a new 
project.  An example of this would be constructing a series of retention basins to accompany a 
new business park that is proposed to be constructed on vacant land.72
 
70 Chiung-Ting Chang, “Introduction of a Tradeable Flood Mitigation Permit System,” Environmental Science & Policy 11, no. 4 (June 2008): 
329–35, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2007.11.002. 
71 Chang. 
72 Chang. 
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73 
Figure 3.3 
 
Despite their limited application, Tradable Flood Management Permits have significant 
potential in the developing regions of the United States.  Land development needs can change 
more rapidly than zoning laws can be altered.  These systems also can incentivize sound building 
practices as well as concentrate risk mitigation from the government and insurance firms.  
It is true that shifting flood risk to the private sector will place a financial burden on some 
insureds.  One example of this is the surge in demand for Florida’s state-backed flood insurer of 
last resort, called Citizens Property Insurance Corporation.  “While Citizens has a 10 percent cap 
on annual rate increases, excluding coverage changes and surcharges, private companies have 
been seeking rate increases of 12 percent to 30 percent.  The Florida Office of Insurance 
Regulation held a public hearing Tuesday on a proposal by First Community Insurance Co. to 
raise rates by an average of 24.5 percent.”74  As previously discussed, policy action to reduce 
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insurance premiums only exacerbates flood losses in the long term.  Charging a fair premium is 
essential for accurate planning from the consumer.   
Ultimately, the private insurance market is best suited to handle the nation’s flood risk.  
Even though the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) was founded with the best intentions, 
the program has produced significant negative externalities.  Shifting the risk on to the private 
sector is completely feasible. Given that the NFIP undercharges for flood coverage, it can be 
difficult for the private sector to compete in this space.  According to the CEO of Chubb 
Limited, “The government under the NFIP charges an inadequate rate in most instances. It 
underprices the cost of risk. It incents people to live in places they otherwise wouldn’t because 
they don’t pay the right price to live with that risk. And it disincents government from putting 
money toward infrastructure to mitigate exposure to floods.”75  Even though it can be tempting to 
coerce insurance premiums via political action, this only generates issues in the long term.  
Undercharging for flood risk simply distorts the underlying risk of inhabiting a certain area.  Not 
only does this exacerbate long term economic losses, but it also puts lives at risk as well.  
Undercharging also prevents private insurers from charging a rate based on actuarial models.  If 
flood risk is to be borne by the insured instead of the taxpayer, insurers must be able to charge 
economically viable rates.  Rates between insurer will vary due to coverage level, risk tolerance, 
actuarial data, as well as other factors.  However, no insurer can compete with a program 
continually undercharges.  Consumers will also enjoy superior outcomes from improved 
insurance offerings that better compensate for losses.  Ultimately, transitioning the nation’s flood 
risk to the private sector will reduce the burden on the taxpayer while reducing flood risk to 
communities.  
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Chapter 4: Overview of the Fair Access to Insurance Requirement 
 
 In addition to the federal government, state governments have also entered the property 
and casualty markets.  One of the most prominent examples has been the Fair Access to 
Insurance Requirement (FAIR) plan in the State of California, which is another way 
governments attempt to mitigate the costs of natural disasters.  This policy differs from the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) as the state government is not collecting premiums 
and writing policies.  Instead, this law mandates that insurers themselves contribute to a pool 
where Californians with no other recourse can purchase insurance.  This form of government 
involvement in property and casualty insurance markets avoids some of the aforementioned 
issues associated with state-run insurance carriers.  However, like the NFIP, the FAIR plan 
simply addresses a symptom of a greater issue in the marketplace.  While both private insurers 
and the FAIR plan itself need to reform their business practices, these reforms will not be 
sufficient until the State of California adopts a new, cohesive strategy for managing wildfires.  
Even though the FAIR plan has been in effect for decades, this policy is unique.  “The 
California Fair Access to Insurance Requirements Plan was created in July 1968 following the 
1960’s brush fires and riots. It is an insurance pool established to assure the availability of basic 
property insurance to people who own insurable property in the State of California and who, 
beyond their control, have been unable to obtain insurance in the voluntary insurance market.  
There is no public funding, or taxpayers’ monies involved. The FAIR Plan is not a state 
agency.”76  Much of California’s forested areas are prone to wildfire risk.  This risk, in part due 
to climate change, has increased over the years.  As a result, many Californians who live in areas 
 
76 “California FAIR Plan Association,” accessed March 3, 2021, https://www.cfpnet.com/. 
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with a high risk of forest fires struggle to purchase insurance.  Like the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP), the FAIR plan also struggles to adequately cover its financial obligations and 
adequately manage risk.   
 The issue of accessible fire insurance is indeed a problem in the State of California.  
Much of this is driven by the rising costs of underwriting fire risk in this region.  In addition to 
increased premiums, insurers may decide to completely withdraw from the California 
marketplace.  When this occurs, insureds are forced to purchase coverage through the FAIR plan 
or through a niche brokerage like Lloyd’s of London. These firms command much higher 
premiums than traditional insurers.  Furthermore, insureds may find that their insured home 
value will not cover the total cost of rebuilding.  Another issue that insureds face is the lack of 
rate adjustments for taking fire mitigation measures.77  “Insurers say they’d like to give 
customers credit for making their homes fire-resistant, but they don’t currently have enough data 
to establish discounts for any particular measures. ‘It’s clear that homeowners and communities 
can do a lot to mitigate the risk,’ says Victor Joseph, chief underwriting officer at Mercury 
Insurance (and a son of its founder, George Joseph), ‘but the data is not well-structured to filter 
into pricing.’ Mercury uses the data to decide whether to accept new business in a given 
community, but not to set rates.”78   The graph below represents the increase in policy non-
renewals initiated by the insurer.  This creates a serious issue for insurers, insureds, and 
policymakers alike. 
 
77 Hiltzik, “Column: California’s Fire Insurance Market Reaches a Crisis.” 
78 Hiltzik. 
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79 
Figure 4.1 
  
The FAIR plan functions differently from other state-run property and casualty systems.  
Every property and casualty insurer that does business in the State of California is required to 
contribute to this pool.  Both businesses and residential properties can be covered. Like the flood 
coverage provided by the NFIP (National Flood Insurance Program), the coverage is much less 
comprehensive than the policy offerings directly purchased through a private insurer.  Coverage 
purchased through the FAIR plan is capped at 1.5 million dollars.  Given the high housing prices 
in many areas of California, this is not sufficient.80   
 
79 Hiltzik. 
80 Veroff, “What Is the California FAIR Plan?” 
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 There are many policy options for both businesses and homeowners alike.  Dwelling 
policies are intended for personal residences.  These policies cover “[one to four] family unit 
dwellings with no more than five roomers or boarders in total, including trailer homes, 
mobile/manufactured homes, or floating homes used exclusively for dwelling purposes at a fixed 
location. Owner occupancy is defined as a building in which at least one unit is occupied by the 
owner. As an example, in a four unit building, if three units are occupied by tenants and one unit 
is occupied by the owner, then the building is considered “owner occupied.” Tenant occupancy is 
defined as a building in which every unit is occupied by tenants. 1-4 family dwelling unit 
properties that are rented in part or in whole for a term of less than one year (e.g. through a 
vacation rental site such as Airbnb) should be submitted under a dwelling application.”81  They 
also cover seasonal residences, vacant homes in certain circumstances, “personal property for 
renters, [and] personal property and improvements, alterations, and additions for condominium 
unit owner[s].”82   
 The FAIR plan also offers coverage for commercial residences and cost of construction.  
Structures that fall into this category are “buildings with five or more habitational units (e.g. 
apartment buildings, hotels, motels), retail mercantile, manufacturing risks, office buildings, 
[and] residential or commercial buildings under course of construction (COC).”83  Small and 
medium sized businesses can obtain coverage through the FAIR plan as well.  “BOP policies 
may be written for eligible retail, apartment, office, service, and processing risks and are 
available for owners of buildings and tenants of retail, service, and processing operations. In 
addition to the type of business for which coverage is being sought, the building height, area 
 
81 “Dwelling Policy,” accessed March 3, 2021, https://www.cfpnet.com/index.php/consumers/dwelling-policy/. 
82 “Dwelling Policy.” 
83 “Commercial Policy,” accessed March 4, 2021, https://www.cfpnet.com/index.php/consumers/commercial-policy/. 
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square footage, number of units and annual gross sales are determining factors for eligibility 
under the BOP program.”84  Finally, the Fair Access to Insurance Requirement (FAIR) plan also 
offers earthquake coverage that can be purchased in conjunction with certain types of fire 
coverage.85   
 In recent years, the FAIR plan has sought to expand coverage offerings to offer insureds 
more coverage options.  The Insurance Commissioner of California wanted to expand coverage 
to offer comprehensive insurance to save insureds money as they would no longer need to 
purchase multiple policies.  However, this was struck down in the court system as the judge 
involved said that this measure would put undue strain on the private sector insurance market.86   
 While these policy options are comprehensive, there are financial issues with the current 
FAIR plan.  Since September 1st, 2020, “the FAIR Plan incurred wildfire claims totaling $350 
million…That’s a considerable sum for a company that took only $400 million in total premium 
revenue.”87  The main goal of the FAIR plan is to make affordable fire insurance available for 
those without other recourse.  Charging market rates negates the mission of the program.  Yet, 
insurers involved in the risk pool may soon find themselves unable to continue to operate in the 
State of California.  If the fire losses both from their direct policies, as well as the ones written 
through the FAIR plan, exceed the profits generated from other lines, it will make financial sense 
for that insurer to no longer offer any insurance products in the state.88  
 
84 “Businessowners Policy,” accessed March 4, 2021, https://www.cfpnet.com/index.php/consumers/businessowners-policy/. 
85 “CEA-Earthquake,” accessed March 4, 2021, https://www.cfpnet.com/index.php/consumers/cea-earthquake/. 
86 “California FAIR Plan Can Offer Only Fire Insurance, Judge Says,” Insurance Journal, February 21, 2020, 
https://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2020/02/21/559030.htm. 
87 Dale Kasler, “‘Last Resort’ Insurance Plan Raising Rates for Rural California Homeowners — Again,” The Sacramento Bee, December 8, 
2020, https://www.sacbee.com/news/california/fires/article247680725.html. 
88 Christopher Flavelle, “California Bars Insurers From Dropping Policies in Wildfire Areas,” The New York Times, November 5, 2020, sec. 
Climate, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/05/climate/california-wildfire-insurance.html. 
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 In California, the state government has the authority to regulate insurance premium 
increases.  “But raising premiums, which are often closely regulated, can create a headache for 
officials. California and other states have the authority to reject or reduce rate increases, and they 
often face pressure from voters to do so.  The result is a dilemma for governments. Either let 
rates rise, squeezing homeowners, or take the chance that more insurers will pull back from 
vulnerable areas, as many across the West are doing already. Without insurance, banks won’t 
issue mortgages, making homes harder to buy or sell.  The challenges are especially pronounced 
in California, where regulations lean toward consumer protection. The state forbids insurance 
companies from setting rates based on what they expect in future damages. Insurers are allowed 
to set rates only based on prior losses.  Regulators also forbid insurers from passing along the 
costs of buying their own insurance, which they do to soften the blow of unexpectedly big losses. 
As wildfires get worse, those costs for insurers are going up as well.  Both rules were designed to 
guard against higher rates. But in the age of climate change, insurers say those rules have 
prevented them from keeping up with wildfire damage.”89  In the aftermath of one particularly 
damaging fire season, the Insurance Commissioner of California prohibited insurers from 
canceling coverage in severely impacted regions.90  These actions are ultimately ineffective as 
the most detrimental policies are not directly insurance related. Even though the Insurance 
Commissioner may have been attempting to act in the best interest of his constituents, these 
types of actions make it increasingly unappealing to offer property and casualty insurance in the 
State of California.  
 
89 Christopher Flavelle, “Wildfires Hasten Another Climate Crisis: Homeowners Who Can’t Get Insurance,” The New York Times, September 2, 
2020, sec. Climate, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/02/climate/wildfires-insurance.html. 
90 Flavelle. 
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 It is essential for the long-term health of the FAIR plan to encourage as many insurers as 
possible to continue to write policies in fire prone areas.  The FAIR plan becomes weaker with 
fewer members.  Californians will suffer from losing property and casualty insurance options for 
other coverage areas than fire protection.  “California’s Department of Insurance issued a report 
quantifying that pullback. For the ZIP codes most affected by the wildfires in 2015 and 2017, the 
number of homeowners dropped by their insurance companies jumped 10 percent between 2017 
and 2018.  In the 10 California counties with the most homes in high-risk areas, the number of 
homeowners’ policies written by major insurers, whose rate increases must be approved by state 
regulators, fell by 5 percent between 2015 and 2018, the department said. Another way of 
measuring the growing reluctance of insurers is the increase in demand for the state’s FAIR plan, 
which is effectively prohibited from turning away customers but typically charges higher 
premiums as a result. In those same 10 highest-risk counties, the number of homeowners getting 
coverage through that plan increased 177 percent while staying flat statewide.  ‘By not being 
able to find insurance, you then in turn can’t sell your home. If you can’t sell your home, then it 
affects the local property taxes,’ said Ricardo Lara, California’s insurance commissioner. ‘This is 
really creating chaos.’  The trade group representing insurers said the fires of the past two years 
had compelled companies to reduce their exposure. Whether that pullback is temporary or 
permanent depends on what the state does next, according to Rex Frazier, president of the 
Personal Insurance Federation of California.  Mr. Frazier said the state should allow insurers to 
raise rates to better reflect the full cost of wildfire risk. He also called for more aggressive forest 
management, such as controlled burns to remove trees, brush and other fuel for wildfires, as well 
as requiring homeowners to keep more space between their houses and the vegetation around 
them.  The alternative — continuing to build homes in dangerous areas, combined with 
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worsening fire conditions and premiums that don’t reflect the true risk of wildfires — is ‘not the 
recipe for a healthy market,’ Mr. Frazier said.”91  This alarming withdraw is heavily impacted by 
restrictive regulations.    
One indicator of the difficulty of writing insurance in the State of California are the 
growing number of non-renewals for fire coverage.  This places additional strain on the insurers 
involved with the FAIR plan as insureds migrate to the insurer of last resort when they are no 
longer covered under their private plan.  “Residential non-renewals by insurance companies 
increased statewide by 31% and FAIR Plan policies increased statewide by 36% from the end of 
2018 to 2019.  New FAIR Plan policies increased by 225% while renewed FAIR [Fair Access to 
Insurance Requirement] Plan policies fell by 1% (an overall 36% increase for new and renewed 
policies).  Most of the growth in insurance company non-renewals and FAIR Plan writing 
happened in areas with higher wildfire risk.”92  If these trends continue, even more pressure will 
be put on the members of the FAIR plan insurance pool. 
 
91 Christopher Flavelle, “As Wildfires Get Worse, Insurers Pull Back From Riskiest Areas,” The New York Times, August 20, 2019. 
92 “Data on Insurance Non-Renewals, FAIR Plan, and Surplus Lines (2015-2019)” (California Department of Insurance, October 19, 2020). 
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Figure 4.2 
 Ultimately, serious reform efforts must be taken to ensure the viability of the FAIR (Fair 
Access to Insurance Requirement) plan as increased pressure on this insurer of last resort 
challenges its solvency.  Since the government does not financially subsidize its balance sheet, 
its biggest financial challenge would arise from its member firms no longer operating within the 
state.  While it is impossible to eliminate fire risk, much of the risk can be managed by changes 
in practices of private sector insurance firms.  However, to achieve a significant reduction in 
wildfire damages, FAIR plan reforms must occur in conjunction with larger policy changes in 
the State of California.  Currently, wildfire control in California focuses on eradication instead of 
management.  Implementing prescribed burns to reduce the severity of wildfire risk would 
dramatically reduce the severity of wildfires.94  Additionally, strict zoning laws in the state 
prevent new construction in areas where housing demand is high.  These housing policies create 
 
93 “Data on Insurance Non-Renewals, FAIR Plan, and Surplus Lines (2015-2019).” 
94 Elizabeth Weil, “Prescribed Burns Prevent Megafires. Why Don’t We Use Them in California?,” Massive Science, September 15, 2020, 
https://massivesci.com/articles/megafire-california-climate-change-wildfire-controlled-burns-fire-management/. 
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a myriad of problems, including forcing Californians to build in fire-prone areas.95  If these 
changes were to occur, it is likely that the need for a state-sponsored insurer of last resort would 
disappear.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
95 Michael Willemsen and Gail Phillips, “Down-Zoning and Exclusionary Zoning in California Law,” Hastings Law Journal 31, no. 1 (January 
1979). 
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Chapter 5: Analysis of the Fair Access to Insurance Requirement  
 
 Even though climate change is a key factor in the severity of natural disasters, addressing 
climate change in a meaningful way is beyond the scope of a state legislature.  Instead, 
increasing the State of California’s wildfire preparedness can be addressed through public policy 
reform and improving insurance practices in the State of California.  Unlike the National Flood 
Insurance Program, the policies that create issues with the FAIR (Fair Access to Insurance 
Requirement) plan arise from policies that do not directly address fire protection.  The two policy 
areas that need to be addressed are the use of prescribed fires and zoning restrictions that prohibit 
new construction in areas with high housing demand.  Similarly, private property and casualty 
insurers need to improve fire risk modelling and incentivize safer building behavior.   
 One of the best solutions to reducing the severity of the damage from wildfires is to 
prevent them from occurring in the first place.  It would be remiss to claim that severe wildfires 
can be completely prevented.  However, the use of prescribed fires can significantly reduce the 
severity of naturally occurring wildfires.  “[A] prescribed fire is a planned fire; it is also 
sometimes called a ‘controlled burn’ or ‘prescribed burn’ and is used to meet management 
objectives. A prescription is a set of conditions that considers the safety of the public and fire 
staff, weather, and probability of meeting the burn objectives.  Prescribed fire is one of the most 
important tools used to manage fire today. A scientific prescription for each fire, prepared in 
advance, describes its objectives, fuels, size, the precise environmental conditions under which it 
will burn, and conditions under which it may be suppressed. The fire may be designed to create a 
mosaic of diverse habitats for plants and animals, to help endangered species recover, or to 
reduce fuels and thereby prevent a destructive fire…In most parks, management-ignited 
prescribed fires are used instead of lightning-caused fires to manage vegetation. Prescribed burns 
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have been ignited to reduce hazardous fuel loads near developed areas, manage landscapes, 
restore natural woodlands, and for research purposes.”96  Yet despite the benefits of controlled 
burns, land management policy in the State of California takes a different approach. 
 Currently, fire management methods in the State of California focus heavily on fire 
suppression.  However, there is much criticism of this policy from fire experts within the state.  
They argue that California’s natural climate lends itself to natural wildfires, unlike other regions 
of the United States.  Academic research indicates that over 1,000 square miles of land burned 
yearly in prehistoric California.  Current fire suppression strategies extinguish small, naturally 
occurring fires that do not pose a threat.  This strategy, in conjunction with a lack of prescribed 
fires, increases the buildup of biomass that fuel dangerous fires.  Some research indicates that 
approximately 31,000 square miles of land would need to burn in order to restabilize fire risk.97  
  New policy that implements controlled burns would be costly.  Fire management experts 
recommend burning approximately 1,700 square miles of land per year.  Controlled burns can 
cost from 200 dollars per acre to over 1,000 dollars per acre depending on the location and 
terrain.  This could cost hundreds of millions of dollars per year.  However, this is significantly 
cheaper than trying to fight a wildfire in the first place; on average, this costs 800 dollars an acre.  
Just one series of severe fires in 2017 created over seven billion dollars of damage in one month 
alone.98   The chart below illustrates the effectiveness of various prescribed burn methods.  
 
 
96 “Wildland Fire: What Is a Prescribed Fire? (U.S. National Park Service),” March 19, 2020, https://www.nps.gov/articles/what-is-a-prescribed-
fire.htm. 
97 Weil, “Prescribed Burns Prevent Megafires. Why Don’t We Use Them in California?” 
98 James Temple, “This Is What California Needs to Do about Its Fires,” MIT Technology Review, September 17, 2020, 
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/09/17/1008473/wildfires-california-prescribed-burns-climate-change-forests/. 
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99 
     Figure 5.1 
 
Clearly prescribed burns must be used to help mitigate wildfire risk in California as the benefits 
outweigh the costs.  However, implementing this effectively and safely will be challenging.   
 One of the leading contributors to fire risk is the buildup of natural biomass that 
contributes to fire severity.  In the Sierra Nevada mountains, trees are dying at an alarming rate.  
Over the past decade, over 129 million trees in the region have died.  There are several causes for 
this.  As previously discussed, excessive fire suppression has led to overcrowded forest with little 
biological diversity.100  Researchers have found that “A century-old policy of putting out all fires, 
known as fire suppression, has created overcrowded forests. Before European settlement, 
naturally-ignited fires and those lit by Native Americans cleared the forest of debris that could 
cause severe fires. These events and practices also checked the growth of new trees that would 
compete with older, bigger trees. The result, said Jim Branham, executive director for the Sierra 
Nevada Conservancy, a state agency that works to improve the well-being of the Sierra Nevada 
 
99 Paulo Fernandes and Herminio Botelho, “A Review of Prescribed Burning Effectiveness in Fire Hazard Reduction” (International Journal of 
Wildland Fire, 2003). 
100 Terry Hardy et al., “Fire on the Mountain: Rethinking Forest Management in the Sierra Nevada” (Little Hoover Commission, February 2018). 
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region, was a ‘very diverse landscape of open, closed, young, and old forests.’  This diversity is 
essential to forest resiliency and helps forests survive a variety of threats.”101   
While damaging, the current policy of fire suppression is not the only reason for this 
buildup of dead trees.  Historic droughts have damaged the region as well.  These two conditions 
have made it easier for bark beetles to cause excessive damage to unhealthy trees.  Under normal 
circumstances, these trees may be able to recover.  However, these beetles can kill struggling 
trees.  While the bark beetles are essential for the health of the ecosystem in the Sierra Nevada 
mountain range, the current conditions have tipped the natural balance.  Officials in the state 
have known about the risks of overgrown forests for decades but have failed to address them.  
Fortunately, policymakers are beginning to adopt a more wholistic approach to forest 
management.  A task force was created in 2018 to “consider how forest management can reduce 
the threat of wild-fires and increase forest resiliency and carbon storage.”102      
While better fire management methods would have a profound impact on wildfires in 
California, improved zoning policies would allow people to move out of harm’s way.  Zoning 
laws in the United States can serve many purposes and are often quite controversial.  In the 
United States, zoning is defined as “the separation or division of a municipality into districts, the 
regulation of buildings and structures in such districts in accordance with their construction and 
the nature and extent of their use, and the dedication of such districts to particular uses designed 
to serve the General Welfare.  Zoning, the regulation of the use of real property by local 
government, restricts a particular territory to residential, commercial, industrial, or other uses.”103 
 
101 Hardy et al. 
102 Hardy et al. 
103 “Zoning Law,” in West’s Encyclopedia of American Law, n.d., https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Zoning+law. 
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Zoning regulations often occur at a municipal level, but state and federal mandates can also 
impact the legal restrictions around land use.  
Proponents of strict land use restrictions support these measures for reasons such as 
preventing overdevelopment, environmental protection, and for historical preservation.  
However, these types of zoning protections can have significant negative externalities.  This 
debate is occurring throughout the country.  One of the more restrictively zoned states is 
Connecticut.  Many move to the state to escape New York City and do not wish to remove 
zoning policies that keep towns rural.104  However, opponents claim that these policies are overly 
restrictive and only benefit the wealthy who already own property in the state.105   
In reality, most economic research indicates that unaffordable housing in the United 
States is a result of restrictive zoning.  In general, “America does not uniformly face a housing 
affordability crisis.  In the majority of places, land costs are low (or at least reasonable) and 
housing prices are close to (or below) the costs of new construction.  In the places where housing 
is quite expensive, zoning restrictions appear to have created these high prices… Difficult zoning 
seems to be ubiquitous in high cost areas… Only in particular areas, especially New York City 
and California, do housing prices diverge substantially from the costs of new construction.”106  
While Los Angeles has been making strides to rectify their restrictive zoning laws, much of the 
city is zoned for single family occupancy.107 San Francisco has equally restrictive zoning 
 
104 “Connecticut’s Zoning Laws a Focus in Racial Equity Debate,” Text.Article, Associated Press (Fox Business, March 16, 2021), 
https://www.foxbusiness.com/real-estate/connecticuts-zoning-laws-a-focus-in-racial-equity-debate. 
105 “Connecticut’s Zoning Laws a Focus in Racial Equity Debate.” 
106 Edward Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko, “The Impact of Zoning on Housing Affordability,” Harvard Institute of Economic Research, no. 1948 
(March 2002). 
107 Elijah Chiland, “Single-Family Homes Cover Almost Half of Los Angeles,” Curbed LA, September 10, 2018, 
https://la.curbed.com/2018/9/10/17827982/single-family-houses-los-angeles-zoning-rules-explained. 
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policies.108  These overly restrictive land use policies have many negative effects, including 
economic ones that hinder growth. 
In addition to the negative externalities previously discussed, California’s strict zoning 
laws also increases its exposure to wildfires.  “For many years virtually every community in 
California endorsed the philosophy of growth. Zoning ordinances in this milieu served merely to 
guide growth and eliminate nuisances. Within the past two decades, however, opposition to 
largely unrestrained growth has arisen and attained political power. In many communities the 
opponents of growth, seeking to preserve the natural and social environment and to reduce the 
burden on local government that accompanies growth, have succeeded in enacting zoning 
ordinances designed to severely limit future development. Similar restrictive provisions enacted 
by the state government have limited development along the Pacific Coast and in the Lake Tahoe 
Basin… Restrictive zoning ordinances give rise to two distinct yet related issues. The first issue 
is one of ‘down-zoning’: by limiting the landowner's use of property, the ordinance may invade 
constitutionally protected rights, either by restricting the use of property to uses less valuable 
than those previously permitted, or by threatening to deny any reasonable use whatsoever. The 
second issue is one of "exclusionary zoning": by limiting the construction of housing, a 
restrictive zoning ordinance may deny prospective immigrants the opportunity to live in the 
community.”109  By artificially restricting the housing supply, Californians who are not wealthy 
are forced to look for housing far away from expensive cities and move into fire prone areas. 
In areas with high economic growth, the demand for housing remains relatively fixed.   
This is especially true for those who are renting in an area before prices increase.  Many housing 
 
108 Kriston Capps, “What’s Really to Blame for San Francisco’s Housing Crisis,” Bloomberg.Com, March 11, 2016, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-03-11/zoning-plays-a-big-role-in-san-francisco-s-housing-crisis-gentrification-and-wealth-
disparity. 
109 Willemsen and Phillips, “Down-Zoning and Exclusionary Zoning in California Law.” 
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advocates rightly criticize this issue.  Finding a different job in a lower cost of living region with 
better housing policies is not always an option for individuals.  However easing zoning 
restrictions in cities like San Francisco would allow for more efficient land use that reflects the 
wants of those who live there.  Many who cannot conveniently relocate are forced to live further 
away in fire prone areas.  While not immune, the City of San Francisco has a significantly lower 
wildfire risk profile than the surrounding communities.  The fire inspector for San Francisco’s 
Division of Fire Prevention and Investigation said “San Francisco is considered very low-risk. 
We do have wildland areas, but not what it’s like up north.”110 Allowing more construction 
within the city limits would reduce the need to live in higher risk areas.  
111 
            Figure 5.2 
  
 As with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), the private insurance market will 
need to adopt to the increased fire risk both within the State of California and beyond.  For a 
 
110 Trisha Thadani, “Could a Wildfire Sweep into San Francisco? Residents Seek Assurance as State Burns,” San Francisco Chronicle, 
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myriad of reasons, the severity of wildfires is increasing in fire prone areas.  Where insurers 
could once dismiss these severe fires as anomalies, actuarial data must be updated to incorporate 
the prevalence of these events.  Historically, underwriting wildfire risk was a profitable line of 
business.  However, that has not been the case since 2017.   
112 
  Figure 5.3 
Insurers are beginning to realize the severity of the problem by petitioning the government to let 
them raise rates or cancelling coverage all together.  However, insurers must update their 
actuarial models to reflect future risk.  While it is impossible to predict the future, insurers can 
improve their models by updating them to “reflect current underlying conditions, such as dry 
vegetation from recent drought, increased housing units built in the wildland urban interface 
(WUI), or any other changes to the insurer’s risk exposures over time. With the further 
complicating factor that insurers are not permitted to reflect net reinsurance costs in their overall 
rates, current regulations could potentially cause a material gap between insurers’ estimates of 
losses and expenses and the corresponding rates that they charge.” 113  Without making these 
 
112 David Evans, Cody Webb, and Eric Xu, “Wildfire Catastrophe Models Could Spark the Changes California Needs” (Milliman, October 28, 
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changes, it is likely that insurers will need to continue to pay out billions in claims over the next 
decade.114 
Ironically, these restrictions raise prices for insurance as fewer insurers will choose to 
write policies in California.  As previously stated, when faced with regulations that force 
unprofitability, it is simply easier to withdraw from the market completely.  Nonetheless, 
insurers would prefer to have access to the California insurance market.  Better risk management 
practices benefit both the insurer and insured.   
Insureds also can incentivize safe building and landscaping practices to help reduce the 
damage from wildfires.  Historically these practices have been quite successful at both reducing 
risk and lowering underwriting costs.  For example, the Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and 
Insurance Company mandated that insureds install an anti-siphon loop to their boilers to reduce 
catastrophic failures.  This program was so successful, anti-siphon loops were often called 
“Hartford Loops.”115  Property and casualty insurers who underwrite fire risk in the State of 
California should implement similar policies to reduce their fire risk.   
The implementation of fire-resistant landscaping has proven to be incredibly effective at 
mitigating wildfire damage.  There are many facets of effective fire-retardant landscaping.  The 
most important method is planting vegetation away from structures that is adequately dispersed.  
It is also essential to keep the insured property clear of debris, such as sticks and leaves.  Planting 
indigenous species also helps with both fire safety and ecological health.  The incorporation of 
stones and gravel can act as an aesthetically pleasing fire break.  If more insurers reduced 
 
114 Luca Weber et al., “Rethinking California Wildfire Risk” (Partner Re, June 2019). 
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premiums when insureds incorporated defensive landscaping practices, all parties involved 
would benefit.116     
 
 
Defensive Landscaping 
117 
       Figure 5.4 
 
 Solving the issues that plague the FAIR (Fair Access to Insurance Requirement) plan is 
complicated as the most harmful policies are not insurance related.  The most effective policy 
change would be to address forestry management.  The current method of fighting all fires, 
regardless of risk, does not reduce the fuel buildup that contributes to the more dangerous 
infernos that can sweep the state.  Prescribed burns, when used appropriately, effectively clear 
out accumulated biomass that increases the severity of the wildfires.  These burns also improve 
overall forest health by clearing the way for new growth.  Improved land use restrictions would 
also allow for more development in areas which are less prone to deadly fires.   
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 Even though the aforementioned changes would reduce the cost of underwriting fire 
insurance in California, the existence of the program is not necessary.  By artificially lowering 
the price of insurance, the true costs and risks are hidden from the insured.  This forced insurance 
pool also restricts the offerings available to Californians as many firms may simply decide that 
offering any form of property and casualty insurance is too costly.  Insurers must also 
acknowledge that climate change will increase the severity and prevalence of wildfires.   
Improved risk modeling and premium-based firescaping incentives will help address the 
increased risk.  By implementing mandatory defensive landscaping and construction, insurers 
would reduce the damage to insureds.  If the FAIR plan no longer hid the true cost of insuring 
property in a fire prone area, insurers could more adequately price policies for all budgets.   
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Chapter 6: Overview of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act  
 
 The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 profoundly impacted the way property and 
casualty insurers underwrote policies; indeed, these attacks were the single most expensive loss 
in the United States to date.  As a result, many insurers decided to exclude terrorism from 
policies due to the difficulty of assessing the risk of these events happening in the future.118  To 
help combat this problem, the federal government created the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
(TRIA) in 2002.  “The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) created a temporary federal 
program that provides for a transparent system of shared public and private compensation for 
certain insured losses resulting from a certified act of terrorism. The Secretary of the Treasury 
administers the program with the assistance of the Federal Insurance Office.”119  Despite its 
temporary nature, it has been reauthorized through 2027 and will likely be extended beyond.120   
TRIA manages risk by providing reinsurance through the federal government.  To date, 
the program has been successful as “premiums have fallen in price, and the federal government’s 
cost for the program has been relatively small so far…Without a TRIA backstop, insurance rates 
or contract exclusions for terrorist events would likely be higher. And although government 
officials have worked to reduce the potential for a major terrorist attack in the United States, the 
possibility has not been eliminated. If the program were not in place, terrorism risk insurance 
rates would be expected to rise unpredictably or might not be offered in some regions or to 
specific properties.”121  Unlike the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) or California Fair 
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Access to Insurance Requirement (FAIR) plan, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) does 
not directly interact with insureds as it offers reinsurance.  Also, TRIA is not under financial 
pressure as terror attacks are far less prevalent than wildfires or floods.  Nonetheless, it is worth 
examining whether it is prudent to continue to reauthorize TRIA past 2027.   
Traditionally, most reinsurance is offered through the private sector.  “Reinsurance is 
insurance for insurance companies. It’s a way of transferring or ‘ceding’ some of the financial 
risk insurance companies assume in insuring cars, homes and businesses to another insurance 
company, the reinsurer. Reinsurance is a highly complex global business. U.S. professional 
reinsurers (companies that are formed specifically to provide reinsurance) accounted for about 7 
percent of total U.S. property/casualty insurance industry premiums written in 2010, according to 
the Reinsurance Association of America. 
The reinsurance business is evolving. Traditionally, reinsurance transactions were 
between two insurance entities: the primary insurer that sold the original insurance policies and 
the reinsurer. Most still are. Primary insurers and reinsurers can share both the premiums and 
losses, or reinsurers may assume the primary company’s losses above a certain dollar limit in 
return for a fee. However, risks of various kinds, particularly of natural disasters, are now being 
sold by insurers and reinsurers to institutional investors in the form of catastrophe bonds and 
other alternative risk-spreading mechanisms.”122  TRIA authorizes the government to take on this 
role.   
Like most-government backed insurance, rates are predetermined through legislative 
mandate.  As of the 2015 renewal, the deductible has been set at “20% of an insurer’s direct 
earned premium of the preceding calendar year and the federal share of compensation was set at 
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85% of insured losses that exceed insurer deductibles until January 1, 2016. Then the federal 
share is decreased by 1 percentage point per calendar year until it reaches 80%.”123  Like many 
reinsurers, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act does not pay the first dollar of a loss.  “The 
program trigger was amended to apply to certified acts with insured losses exceeding $100 
million for calendar year 2015, $120 million for calendar year 2016, $140 million for calendar 
year 2017, $160 million for calendar year 2018, $180 million for calendar year 2019, and $200 
million for calendar year 2020 and any calendar year thereafter…The insurance marketplace 
aggregate retention amount was established at the lesser of $27.5 billion, increasing annually by 
$2 billion until it equals $37.5 billion, and the aggregate amount of insured losses for the 
calendar year for all insurers. In the calendar year following the calendar year in which the 
marketplace retention amount equals $37.5 billion, and beginning in calendar year 2020 it is 
revised to be the lesser of the annual average of the sum of insurer deductibles for all insurers 
participating in the Program for the prior three calendar years as such sum is determined by the 
Secretary of the Treasury by regulation.”124  If a terrorist attack occurs, the federal government 
must determine if the event qualifies for a payout.   
TRIA also provides some coverage for nuclear, biological, chemical, and radiological 
terrorist attacks.  “The current TRIA statute does not specifically include or exclude [Nuclear, 
Biological, Chemical, and Radiological] NBCR events; thus, the TRIA program in general 
would cover insured losses from terrorist actions due to NCBR as it would for an attack by 
conventional means. The term insured losses, however, is a meaningful distinction. Except for 
workers’ compensation insurance, most insurance policies that would fall under the TRIA 
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umbrella include exclusions that would likely limit insurer coverage of an NCBR event, whether 
it was due to terrorism or to some sort of accident, although these exclusions have never been 
legally tested in the United States after a terrorist event.”125  However, experts in terrorism claim 
that an NCBR event is increasingly likely.126 
One of the primary arguments in favor of TRIA is that terrorist attacks could exceed the 
risk appetite for the current insurance market.  “The potential damage from a single terrorist 
attack, particularly in large cities, could be sufficiently large that it would bankrupt one or a 
group of insurers. Damage from a large chemical, nuclear, or biological attack could cost as 
much as $42.2 billion in a city the size of Des Moines, Iowa, or $778 billion in New York, 
according to a 2006 report from the Academy’s Terrorism Risk Insurance Subcommittee.”127  
Since other insurable events occur with a degree of randomness, events like flood losses and 
automobile accidents are easier to cost effectively underwrite.  “As a general matter, insurance 
succeeds by spreading the random cost of losses across a large number of insured. But terrorist 
attacks are designed to maximize economic and psychological impact, and consequently do not 
occur at random times or places. Historically, they are more likely to occur in large cities, at 
specific targets, and perhaps even on specific dates. Because they are not random, terrorist 
attacks make insuring specific types of properties or locations much riskier than insuring against 
other risks.”128  Given that terror attacks are completely random and infrequent, maintaining the 
adequate reserves to cover a loss becomes increasingly difficult.  
The modern risk of cyber terrorism is another form of terrorism that was not as prevalent 
when the policy was originally enacted.  It is debatable as to whether a cyber attack would be 
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covered by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA).  Given the high dollar threshold for a 
payout, few cyber attacks would qualify.  Furthermore, an event would need to be certified by 
the government as a terrorist attack that puts lives or infrastructure at physical risk.  Breaches, 
such as a ransomware attack, would most likely not qualify.  However, a cyber-attack against the 
control systems for critical infrastructure, such as water treatment or air traffic would meet the 
necessary criteria.129    
Furthermore, insurers struggle to accurately develop actuarial models that can accurately 
account for risk.  Insureds living on a fault line or a floodplain will obviously be a greater 
insurance liability than those who live in less risky areas.  Densely populated urban locations are 
at a greater risk because terrorists intend for their attack to inflict maximum harm.  However, that 
is not always the case.  Many terror attacks in the United States have taken place in smaller 
cities.  Victims of terror attacks can do very little to lessen their risk exposure, unlike with other 
forms of property and casualty losses.130  Given the uncertain, and potentially catastrophic, nature 
of terror attacks, the demand for terrorism protection in insurance clauses has risen since the 
inception of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA).131 
Fortunately, there have not been many terror attacks domestically in the United States 
since the 2001 destruction of the World Trade Center Complex.  There is some ambiguity as to 
exactly what constitutes a terror attack.  According to the FBI, domestic terrorism is constituted 
by “violent, criminal acts committed by individuals and/or groups to further ideological goals 
stemming from domestic influences, such as those of a political, religious, social, racial, or 
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environmental nature.”132  Even though there have been examples that fit into this category since 
the attacks of September 11th, 2001, none have resulted in the same levels of property damage 
and destruction.133  Since the passage of TRIA in 2002, the capacity of insurers to handle 
insurance risk has increased.  The “Treasury found that the total premium amount paid for 
terrorism coverage in 2017 was approximately $3.65 billion, or 1.75%, of the $209.15 billion in 
total premiums for TRIA-eligible lines of insurance. Since the passage of TRIA, Treasury 
estimates that a total of approximately $38 billion was earned for terrorism coverage by non-
related insurers, with another $7.4 billion earned by captive insurers (i.e., insurers who are 
owned by the insureds).”134  However, the increase of catastrophic weather events could deplete 
these reserves.135   
To date, there have been no terror attacks that have triggered the cost threshold outlined 
in the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA).136  As a result, it is difficult to judge the 
effectiveness of TRIA as it has not been tested.  In the event of another severe terror attack, it is 
likely that there would be some legal challenges raised.  Given the general stability of the 
property and casualty insurance market and lack of severe terror claims, it is unclear whether 
TRIA needs to be reauthorized again in the future.  Certain experts argue that TRIA allows for 
the existence of comprehensive terrorism insurance.  “On the whole, insurance and reinsurance 
pricing has been surprisingly stable despite two extraordinary years for hurricane losses (2005 
and 2017) and a global financial crisis in 2008.  The relative market calm has, however, been 
underpinned by the existence of TRIA. Insurers are required to offer terrorism coverage under 
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the act and it seems possible, if not likely, that insurers would again seek to exclude terrorism 
losses if this requirement were to be removed. For example, when the Terrorism Risk Insurance 
Act (TRIA) briefly lapsed at the end of 2014, conditional terrorism exclusions that had been 
included in insurance filings with state insurance regulators were activated.  Exactly how 
widespread these exclusions would be applied if TRIA were completely removed, however, is 
unclear. It is possible that competitive pressure might cause insurers to cover terrorism risk even 
without TRIA. The latest Treasury report found that 30% of terrorism coverage that is provided 
in conjunction with other property and casualty insurance is offered without specific premiums 
being charged, which suggests that the perceived terrorism risk is low for some of the 
insureds.”137 While the necessity of TRIA is debatable, it would be remiss to downplay its role in 
modern property and casualty markets.  The construction and use of high-rise office space would 
become significantly less appealing if the proprietors and renters would not be compensated in 
the event of a costly terror attack. 
In addition to the rarity of terror attacks that meet the TRIA thresholds, recent 
demographic shifts may further reduce the demand for terrorism insurance in major cities.  As 
with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), the demographic shifts brought about by the 
COVID-19 pandemic may permanently reduce the demand for dense urban real estate.  Since 
March of 2020, the demand for many types of commercial real estate has decreased.  Office 
space leases have decreased as more people are working remotely.  The hospitality industry has 
been drastically impacted as travel and dining have significantly slowed.  It is likely that the 
hospitality industry will eventually rebound in some form once the public health restrictions 
limiting their accessibility are lifted.  Although population shifts away from cities may change 
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where hospitality services operate.  Even after the public health restrictions are lifted, it is 
unclear as to whether demand for urban office space will return to previous levels.138 
Leasing, purchasing, and maintaining office space in cities is very expensive.  
Furthermore, many workers prefer to do some or all their work from home.  62 percent of 
employees with a bachelor’s degree or higher say that they can telework effectively.  However, 
only 23 percent of those without a four-year degree can do so.  Furthermore, over 60 percent of 
those teleworking report similar or increased levels of job satisfaction and productivity.  
However, the shift towards remote work has not been exclusively positive.  Workers under the 
age of 50 report a decrease in motivation.  Working parents, regardless of gender, also struggle 
to manage childcare and vocational responsibilities.139  Given these trends, it is likely that there 
will be a permanent reduction in demand for commercial office space.  Organizations that return 
to in-person work may adopt an open floor plan without permanently assigned desks and bring 
their workers in as needed.  This arrangement may prove to be satisfactory for all involved as 
employees can choose between in-person and remote work.  Organizations will also enjoy a 
reduced real estate expenditure. 
   Unlike the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and the California Fair Access to 
Insurance Requirement (FAIR) plan, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) has not needed to 
pay out claims as there has yet to be a terrorist attack costly enough to qualify for compensation.  
As a result, reauthorization of TRIA is never particularly contentious.  There are also not 
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significant reform proposals. However, it is worth examining the impacts of the program to avoid 
negative externalities.   
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Chapter 7: Analysis of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
 
 Unlike other government backed insurance schemes, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
(TRIA) differs from the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and the California Fair 
Access to Insurance Requirement (FAIR) plan because it has never been needed and acts a form 
of reinsurance.  As a result, reform is seldom discussed and its reapproval is not particularly 
controversial.  The 116th Congress reapproved TRIA through the year 2027 in a 71 to 23 vote.140  
Unlike the NFIP or the California Fair Access to Insurance Requirement (FAIR) plan, budgetary 
issues are not threatening the member institutions, governments, or the insureds.  Given the 
relative infrequency of terror attacks in comparison to natural disasters and the high limit, it is 
possible that no claims will ever be paid under TRIA.  Nonetheless, it is important to examine 
the function of TRIA as its relative success could influence reforms of other policies.  
Additionally, it is worth discussing whether TRIA is needed at all.  
 While vitally important, reinsurance is not directly visible to the end user, so it gains less 
attention than other insurance vehicles.  Reinsurers are paid by insurers to assume a portion of 
their risk.  This distribution of risk helps insurers reduce their exposure to catastrophic losses and 
keep premiums affordable.141  “Under a reinsurance agreement, a reinsurer takes on part of the 
risk that an insurer has written. Reinsurers deal therefore with professional corporate 
counterparties, such as primary insurers, reinsurance brokers or multinational corporations and 
their own insurance companies, so-called captive insurers. The party transferring the risk, for 
example a primary insurer, is known as a cedant. The original policyholder,  
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for example the home owner or airline operator, is not involved in the transaction. There are 
many different forms and types of reinsurance contracts: They either cover entire insurance 
portfolios or just relate to single risks; they may involve a sharing of all premiums and losses or 
they may just cover losses exceeding a certain threshold. Whatever the differences between the 
various contracts, they all have the same ultimate goal: Reinsurance contracts help provide 
capital relief, they smooth the volatility in an insurance company’s earnings and protect their 
balance sheet.”142  The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) acts as a reinsurer for catastrophic 
property losses resulting from terrorism.   
 Prior to the September 11th terrorist attacks, the United States Federal Government did 
not offer any form of insurance against terror attacks.  However, these attacks proved to be the 
costliest in United States history.  In 2001, the total cost of the September 11th attacks was 
approximately 18.8 billion dollars.  The second most costly was the 1993 bombing of the World 
Trade Center, which caused 510 million dollars of damage.143  Given the abnormally high cost, 
the Federal Government implemented TRIA as a temporary measure to address the high losses 
from the September 11th terrorist attacks.  The primary justifications for the continued renewal of 
TRIA are the potential for future costly terrorist attacks and low cost to the federal government.  
Furthermore, some argue that if TRIA would cease to exist, it is possible that insurers would no 
longer provide coverage for terror attacks.144  However, it is possible that the private insurance 
market could completely cover the risk of terrorist attacks in the future through improved 
underwriting practices and reinsurance modeling. 
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 Terrorist attacks, such as the ones that occurred on September 11th, 2001, impact the 
property and casualty marketplace in a myriad of ways.  The graph below illustrates the types of 
losses triggered by this event. 
145 
 Figure 7.1 
 Increased insurance premiums across these product lines can have wide-reaching impacts in 
various industries.  For example, increased aviation related insurance premiums can cause the 
price of airline tickets to increase.  Similarly, insurance premiums for high rise office space may 
increase, forcing certain businesses to less expensive regions.  There is some evidence that 
terrorist-prone businesses can continue to operate because of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 
(TRIA).  Without the federal backstop for catastrophic terror losses, some estimate that up to 80 
percent of property casualty insurers would exclude terrorism coverage from their policies.146  If 
the terrorism risk is so great that the insurance market cannot adequately underwrite the risks 
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involved, it raises the question as to whether the end consumer benefits from this arrangement.  
Often when governments subsidize insurance markets, the true risk of a behavior is obfuscated.  
This perverse incentive occurs frequently with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).  
Insureds are not charged an adequate premium for the risk involved, which incentivizes risky 
construction habits.  If high rise building construction in large cities can occur only if the federal 
government is protecting against terrorism losses, then consumers may determine the risk is not 
worth the benefits.  However, this is unlikely.  Costly terrorist attacks, while tragic, are 
incredibly rare.  “More Americans die in animal attacks than in terrorist attacks.”147  Sufficient 
pressures exist from a myriad of industries that private sector product offerings would most 
likely take their place, absent of harmful regulation. 
 Certain specialty insurers offer products that can help protect against terrorism damages.  
Data analytics firms, such as Verisk, are “collecting, aggregating, and helping analyze terrorism 
data this year for the U.S. Department of the Treasury, the federal agency charged with gauging 
the effectiveness of the federal Terrorism Risk Insurance Program.”148  Accurate risk modelling 
is essential for successful underwriting.  Given the infrequency of terrorism losses, the challenge 
of building quality actuarial models will always exist.  However, these product offerings will 
help reduce this issue.   
 Certain insurers have also launched products that directly address terrorism risk.  Startup 
insurer, Mosaic Insurance, is now offering globally available products to protect against “war, 
terrorism, and political violence…Tailored coverage will span commercial, industrial, and 
residential property risks associated with acts of terror and sabotage, malicious damage, strikes, 
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riots, civil commotion, and war perils worldwide…Mosaic said its broad range of stand-alone 
terrorism products can be written as primary, excess, or quota-share coverage to mitigate 
damage, business disruption costs, or lost sales revenues in the event of attacks or 
threats…Mosaic will act as a lead market, with maximum capacity of $50 million for any one 
risk, and through its US operation, will offer up to $250 million through syndicated capacity.”149  
Since Mosaic only began writing policies several months ago, it is difficult to determine its 
effectiveness.  Nonetheless, it is encouraging to see private insurers willing to enter this space as 
these risks have traditionally been difficult to insure.   
 Certain insurers, such as Chubb Limited, also offer political risk insurance.  These 
policies cover a wide range of political instabilities, including Political Violence & Forced 
Abandonment.  “When political violence erupts, it can manifest itself in a variety of ways that 
standalone terrorism insurance does not always respond to, for example when companies are 
forced to leave a country due to physical danger.”150  These policies cover unique situations such 
as “damage to, or destruction of, physical assets as a result of physical violence.  [They also 
cover] abandonment of the assets or the foreign enterprise, or the abandonment of the operations 
of the foreign enterprise, as a result of political violence.”151  While limited, there are many 
private offerings that seek to address the risk of terrorism.  
 In recent years, the threat of cyber terrorism has increased as society has become more 
interconnected.  While the definition of cyber terrorism is open to interpretation, experts 
generally agree that “Cyberterrorism is the convergence of cyberspace and terrorism. It refers to 
unlawful attacks and threats of attacks against computers, networks and the information stored 
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therein when done to intimidate or coerce a government or its people in furtherance of political 
or social objectives.  Further, to qualify as cyberterrorism, an attack should result in violence 
against persons or property, or at least cause enough harm to generate fear. Attacks that lead to 
death or bodily injury, explosions, or severe economic loss would be examples. Serious attacks 
against critical infrastructures could be acts of cyberterrorism, depending on their impact. 
Attacks that disrupt nonessential services or that are mainly a costly nuisance would not.”152  
Many notable cyber attacks on private businesses and government entities in recent years have 
demonstrated the vulnerability of the nation’s cyber infrastructure.   
 Cyber-attacks are not just limited to breaches of personal information.  Lives can be put 
at immediate danger as critical infrastructure is increasingly controlled by networked computers.  
A recent cyber-attack targeted a water treatment facility where “the hacker was able to use 
remote access software to raise the levels of sodium hydroxide in the water from about 100 parts 
per million to 11,100 parts per million for a few minutes, according to investigators. Sodium 
hydroxide is used in liquid drain cleaners and used, in small doses, to remove metals from 
water.”153 Fortunately, a plant manager noticed the issue and rectified it before anyone was 
harmed.  However, this potentially fatal attack was largely avoidable.  “The cyber actors likely 
accessed the system by exploiting cybersecurity weaknesses, including poor password security 
and an outdated Windows 7 operating system to compromise software used to remotely manage 
water treatment…The actor also likely used the desktop sharing software TeamViewer to gain 
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unauthorized access to the system.”154  Worryingly, this is not an isolated instance; the potential 
for these threats exists throughout utility infrastructure in the United States.155 
 A recent report from McKinsey & Company has observed three main severe 
vulnerabilities in utility infrastructure that poses a serious threat for cyber terrorism.  “First is an 
increased number of threats and actors targeting utilities: nation-state actors seeking to cause 
security and economic dislocation, cybercriminals who understand the economic value 
represented by this sector, and hacktivists out to publicly register their opposition to utilities’ 
projects or broad agendas. The second vulnerability is utilities’ expansive and increasing attack 
surface, arising from their geographic and organizational complexity, including the decentralized 
nature of many organizations’ cybersecurity leadership. Finally the electric-power and gas 
sector’s unique interdependencies between physical and cyber infrastructure make companies 
vulnerable to exploitation, including billing fraud with wireless “smart meters,” the 
commandeering of operational-technology (OT) systems to stop multiple wind turbines, and 
even physical destruction.”156  It is essential that utility operators address these faults as a 
successful cyber-attack against critical infrastructure would be catastrophic.   
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157 
 Figure 7.2 
 Perhaps the most important defensive measures are proactive ones.  Utility operators 
must address known security flaws, of which there are many, to reduce the likelihood of 
successful cyber breaches.158  It would be remiss to claim that the aforementioned attack on the 
Florida water treatment facility would not have occurred if proper data security measures were 
implemented.  However, the poor security practices significantly increased the likelihood of it 
occurring.159  Cyber security cannot only be the responsibility of the information technology 
department either.  All employees need to be involved in cyber security and given proper training 
for their role.  While these data practices may be inconvenient at times, they can significantly 
reduce cyber vulnerabilities.  Industry-wide collaboration can also help reduce security flaws.  If 
utility providers across the country were to communicate about potential breaches and cyber 
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security best practices, then avoidable mistakes are less likely to be repeated.160  As the risk of 
cyber terrorism increases, so must the investment in cyber security.   
 In recent decades, both the public and private sector have taken an interest in addressing 
the weaknesses in the infrastructure in the United States.  The Biden Administration has 
proposed an infrastructure improvement plan they claim will cost approximately 2.3 trillion 
dollars, called The American Jobs Plan.  Even though more investment in infrastructure is 
needed, the Biden Administration’s proposal is unlikely to achieve its goal.  The proposal seeks 
to raise taxes to fund the cost of federal investment in infrastructure.  However, much of the 
infrastructure in the United States is, at least partially, controlled by the private sector.  Some 
estimates claim that the accompanying “tax increases would reduce private investment by more 
than $1 trillion. Biden’s proposed green and labor union regulations would further undermine 
infrastructure investment.”161  Instead, incentivizing private sector innovation will yield better 
outcomes. 
 One private sector solution to cyber attacks is cyber liability insurance.  This type of 
policy “helps protect organizations from the fallout from cyberattacks and hacking threats. 
Having a cyber insurance policy can help minimize business disruption during a cyber incident 
and its aftermath, as well as potentially covering the financial cost of some elements of dealing 
with the attack and recovering from it.”162  Like many niche insurance product offerings, the 
cyber security insurance industry is facing many challenges.  The cost and severity of these 
attacks has been increasing yearly.  There were 1.8 billion dollars of cyber losses in 2019.163  
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Despite the obvious risk, many organizations struggle to determine “how much cyber insurance 
they need. But, it’s difficult for insurers to understand demand when the buyers themselves are 
still trying to figure out both their exposure and their buying appetites.  The years where cyber 
insurance enjoyed significant growth weren’t enough to establish a reliable sense of how much 
protection companies should actually buy. In fact, most either don’t have enough cyber insurance 
or any at all. Companies with at least $200 million in cyber insurance account for a bit more than 
20% of what is believed to be $5 billion in global cyber insurance premium, according to internal 
research conducted by PCS — amounting to roughly $1.1 billion in premium. With around 250 
companies buying at least $200 million in protection, it would only take five insured losses of a 
bit more than that amount to wipe out an entire year’s premium.”164  If cyber risk becomes too 
costly to insure, then insurers will no longer offer these products.   
 Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the cybersecurity insurance market are new 
regulations that would make resolving cyber-attacks far more complicated.  Ransomware is an 
increasingly common type of cyber-attack where the victim’s computers are encrypted, “holding 
a company’s data hostage until a payment is made. Organizations have often ponied up ransoms 
to liberate their data.”165  Increased scrutiny around these transactions from the United States 
Treasury will severely limit the ability of firms to pay ransoms if the attacker is restricted by 
sanctions.166  Ultimately this defense against cyber-attacks may become unavailable.   
 Attempts to assess the effectiveness of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) is very 
difficult as the program has never been implemented.  However, its operational structure has 
merits.  As seen with the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), serious problems arise when 
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the government attempts to directly write insurance policies.  By acting as a reinsurer only for 
severe losses, the federal government avoids the issues presented with the NFIP.  In practice, 
insurers and businesses alike share much of the burden of reducing terrorism risk.  It is very 
difficult to prevent conventional acts of terror, like the ones that destroyed the World Trade 
Centers.  However, builders can use better construction techniques to reduce the severity of an 
attack.167  Fortunately, acts of cyber terrorism are more preventable. Private insurers and 
organizations alike also must turn their attention to cybersecurity issues to mitigate or prevent 
them before they occur.     
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
 
 While the aforementioned state-sponsored property and casualty offerings are by no 
means an exhaustive list, they each represent a unique public policy solution to the problem of 
property and casualty insurance accessibility.  Yet all these policies are similar in that they are 
government solutions to issues within the insurance market.  Devastating property losses 
severely impact the well-being and economic capacity of the populace.  As a result, the federal 
and state governments have sought to rectify these issues.  These types of policies are 
underpinned by the belief that the government is capable of solving problems that are beyond the 
reach of the private sector.  Much like the Greek playwrights who relied on a higher power to 
resolve difficult problems within the play, state-sponsored property and casualty insurance plans 
like the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), the California Fair Access to Insurance 
Requirement (FAIR) plan, and the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act are a form of political Deus Ex 
Machina.168  In other words, “the issue is security property rights or facilitating exchange, the 
idea is that government can and will fix problems.  [The property law scholar], Ellickson, uses 
‘the phrase of legal centralism to describe the belief that governments are the chief sources of 
rules and enforcement efforts.’  Legal centralism takes various forms, but all forms assume that 
markets would not be able to fully function without government rules and regulations…The 
strongest forms of legal centralism consider legal rules or regulation to be costless…while 
weaker forms of legal centralism recognize some costs of legal rules or regulations but still 
consider them absolutely necessary.”169  Neither assumption about the role of government 
correctly applies to government involvement in property and casualty insurance markets.  
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However, it would be remiss to exclusively blame the shortcomings of these programs on their 
management and structure.  While these policies are well intentioned, their negative externalities 
outweigh the benefits.  Instead, the federal and state governments that operate these programs 
should gradually transfer the risk completely to the private sector and dissolve the programs. 
 Of the discussed programs, the NFIP (National Flood Insurance Program) is the most 
fraught with issues.  The most obvious issue with the NFIP are its financially unstable 
underwriting practices.  The Congressional Research Service outlines three main objectives of 
the program, which are “to (1) identify and map the nation’s regulated floodplains to make the 
public aware of flood hazards; (2) address the escalating cost of federal disaster assistance for 
flood damaged buildings and their contents; (3) allow property owners within communities that 
adopted and enforced a Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) approved floodplain 
management ordinance to purchase insurance as a protection against flood losses; and (4) guide 
development and building practices to save lives and reduce future property damage.”170  The 
NFIP fails to adequately achieve any of these goals.   
 The primary reason for this failure is because the underlying premise is fundamentally 
flawed.  Addressing the rising costs of flood insurance by offering below-market insurance 
premiums is inherently unsustainable.  If a private insurer overcharges or undercharges for 
insurance, they will quickly go out of business.  Overcharging for insurance gives other 
competitors the opportunity to write the risk profitably while earning the business of a segment 
of customers unwilling to pay higher rates, forcing the legacy firm to lower rates or cease 
operations.  Similarly, if an insurer undercharges, then the repeated underwriting losses would 
force insolvency.  Given that the NFIP is backed by the federal government, the incentive to 
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innovate and charge appropriate premiums disappears since losses are absorbed by the 
government.  If policymakers desire to stop the continual losses, then the NFIP would need to 
charge higher premiums in line with the rates the private market charges.  However, doing so 
completely negates the purpose of the NFIP.  Subsidies do not lower the cost of a good or 
service, but merely shift it elsewhere.  In the case of the National Flood Insurance Program 
(NFIP), the cost is shifted to the taxpayer.   
 Supporters of the NFIP argue that providing affordable insurance to the nation outweighs 
the budget overages.  However, a significant number of recipients who receive coverage through 
the program do not need financial assistance.  Half of the counties with the costliest losses for the 
NFIP have a median household income above the national average; 171  Nassau County, New 
York has one of the highest median household incomes in the country.172  Additionally, 
approximately a quarter of the properties insured by the NFIP are vacation homes.173  Even 
though many insured properties belong to low-income homeowners, these subsidies ultimately 
harm these homeowners as they lack the incentive to relocate to a safer area. 
Another, arguably more problematic issue with subsidizing insurance premiums is that it 
hides the true cost from the consumer.  Insurance premiums represent the cost of hedging against 
a certain risk.  While not infallible, the actuarial models used to underwrite risk are incredibly 
comprehensive.  If insureds would not be willing to pay an insurance premium commensurate 
with the level of risk of living in a flood prone area, then hiding that true cost helps no one.  
Instead, it is better to allow natural market prices to communicate risk information to insureds.  
Those who do not wish to deal with the true risk of living in a flood prone area would be 
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incentivized to live in a location that better aligns with their risk tolerances.  Even if the NFIP 
were to update flood maps in conjunction with the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), it would not necessarily fix the aforementioned issues.  Updated flood maps will not 
guarantee that premiums will reflect true risk.  Since the NFIP is ultimately accountable to 
elected politicians, necessary rate increases may cause elected officials to lose popularity with 
their constituents.   
Like the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), the California Fair Access to 
Insurance Requirement (FAIR) plan is also structurally flawed and should be repealed.  Instead 
of directly collecting premiums, the FAIR plan establishes a pool into which all property and 
casualty insurers in the State of California must contribute.  FAIR is intended to provide last 
resort basic property insurance coverage to Californians who cannot obtain insurance normally.  
Primarily, insureds seek out protection from wildfire damages.  The insurers in the pool offer 
policies with premiums controlled by the state.  Unlike the NFIP, the FAIR plan does not require 
the taxpayer to directly subsidize losses from poor underwriting discipline.  However, the same 
issues that arise price distortion also harm the citizens of California.  In one form or another, 
someone must pay for the true cost of writing insurance in a region frequently ravaged by 
wildfires.  Since all property and casualty insurers must contribute to this pool, the costs are 
dispersed across their product lines.  If they are not permitted to charge a market rate for policies 
written by FAIR, then they must increase premiums elsewhere to account for these losses.  If the 
losses are severe enough, an insurer may decide that it is not worth the expense of writing any 
policy in California.  This outcome would be particularly devastating for FAIR as it can only 
operate if its costs are distributed across many insurers.   
 
80 
 
The biggest policy challenges that face both the property and casualty insurance market 
and the FAIR plan are poor forestry management and land use rules.  The most populated 
regions in the state also have strict zoning policies that force development away from cities in 
areas that are threatened by severe wildfires.  If state and local policymakers would reverse 
harmful zoning problems, development could occur in cities where wildfire risk is minimal. 
Similarly, poor forestry management policies increase the risk of severe fires in the State.  
When a wildfire breaks out in California, firefighters seek to extinguish the blaze as quickly as 
possible.  However, this behavior does not naturally replicate the cyclical nature of wildfires in 
the region.  The use of prescribed burns can ensure the safety of these natural fires, which also 
reduce the severity of random wildfires by reducing the fuel that would otherwise burn.  Since 
climate change has extended the fire season in California, properly implementing controlled 
burns has become an even more essential part of forestry management.  
Another way that governments become involved in property and casualty markets is by 
acting as a reinsurer.  The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) allows the Federal Government 
to act as a reinsurer for severe losses from terrorism.  Reinsurance firms are paid by insurers to 
assume the risk that the insurer does not wish to hold.  TRIA functions similarly.  This law was 
enacted after the devastating attacks of September 11th, 2001.  In comparison to the FAIR plan 
and the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), TRIA has been a success.  In the years 
following the 2001 terrorist attacks, property and casualty insurers were willing to include 
terrorism in their policies.  It is possible that without TRIA, property and casualty insurers would 
no longer be willing to do so.  However, it is difficult to fully assess the success of TRIA since 
there have not been any terrorist attacks that have qualified for a payout.         
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The excessively burdensome regulation that many insurers face prevents necessary 
investment in actuarial and underwriting tools.  Recent regulatory initiatives both in the United 
States and abroad have only added to this burden.  One of the most drastic global regulatory 
measures have been restrictions on the handling of personal data.  All insurers operating within 
the European Union must comply with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).  This 
bill sets forth strict data privacy and handling rules.  As expensive as compliance may be, 
noncompliance is even costlier.  Companies that fail to comply with GDPR may face fines of 
over 20 million dollars.174  In the United States, the State of California has enacted a similar law 
called the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).  Like the GDPR requirements, the CCPA 
mandates that consumers have “[1] The right to know about the personal information a business 
collects about them and how it is used and shared; [2] the right to delete personal information 
collected from them (with some exceptions); [3] the right to opt-out of the sale of their personal 
information; [4] and the right to non-discrimination for exercising their CCPA rights.”175  As a 
result of these strict stipulations both domestically and abroad, insurers must spend millions 
annually to be in compliance.176  Despite the positive intentions of these policies, their 
complexity diverts resources away from product development and investment.  Furthermore, 
their complexity and cost will prevent innovative, start-up insurers from competing against 
legacy firms.  In addition to the negatives associated with decreased market competition in 
existing marketplaces, these regulations may prevent start-ups from offering new insurance 
products as well.    
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In addition to new guidelines governing user data, domestic and foreign regulatory bodies 
are increasing restrictions in other areas as well.  The International Association of Insurance 
Supervisors (IAIS) and the domestic Own Risk and Solvency Assessment (ORSA) has outlined 
financial resiliency standards to assess financial strength throughout the business cycle.177  
“President Biden’s new administration may potentially reverse certain aspects of the prior 
administration’s aggressive deregulation, meaning the insurance industry might once again find 
itself challenged by what had been an evolving ‘dual’ regulatory system. It could also lead to 
friction with state regulators and possibly reignite the dual regulatory dynamic, at least for large 
and global insurers.”178  State regulatory boards also heavily monitor the insurance industry.  
Heads of state regulators have expressed interest in introducing more restrictions addressing 
climate issues, racial justice, digital and data usage, among others.179  
It is most likely that state regulators will tackle climate issues most aggressively.  Given 
the threat that climate change poses to the property and casualty insurance market, many may 
view this as a beneficial shift.  In 2020, the New York State insurance regulatory body outlined 
climate change guidance for insurers that operate within the State.  Insurers must incorporate 
“climate-related financial risks into their governance frameworks, risk management processes, 
and business strategies.  In a similar expectations letter to all New York–regulated domestic and 
foreign insurance companies, NYDFS expects all insurers under its supervision to ‘designate a 
board member or a committee of the board, as well as a senior management function” to be 
accountable for the firm’s assessment and management of climate-related financial risks. At an 
enterprise level, NYDFS expects that each insurer ‘should take a proportionate approach that 
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reflects its exposure to the financial risks from climate change and the nature, scale, and 
complexity of its business.’”180  For insurers that operate within the United States, state 
regulatory bodies impact the insurance industry as much as federal regulatory bodies.   
 Given the importance of insurance to societal function, it is reasonable that the Federal 
and state governments would seek to ensure access to those who need it.  Yet, ironically, these 
protections make it more difficult for potential insureds to get the coverage they need.  Both the 
National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) and California Fair Access to Insurance Requirement 
(FAIR) plan made it more difficult for insurers to offer flood and fire policies.  Given the rarity 
of terror attacks, the ill effects of the other programs are less evident.  Nonetheless, the private 
sector is still better equipped to deal with terrorism risk, especially as cyber terrorism is 
becoming more prevalent.  Many insurance regulations intended to help the consumer do not 
achieve this goal.  Various data protection acts, while well intentioned, outline extremely 
difficult compliance standards.  The high costs of these compliance measures prevent smaller 
firms from competing with established ones.  Additional taxes on corporate earning and 
investment income would also be damaging for the insurance industry as these taxes would limit 
the accumulation of necessary reserves to pay out severe losses.  In the presence of market 
competition free from unnecessary barriers, insurers are still incentivized to address serious 
issues such as climate change and equal access to insurance, independent of government action.  
This market freedom also allows for start-ups to offer insurance products that otherwise would 
not exist at a reasonable price.  The best solutions to property and casualty insurance problems 
come not from the state, but from lassiez-faire innovations. 
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